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Letting Katz out of the Bag: Cognitive Freedom
and Fourth Amendment Fidelity
CHRISTIAN

M.

HALLIBURTON*

[F]reedom of thought ... is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a pervasive
recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and
legal.'
INTRODUCTION

What would happen if it became impossible to keep a secret? What
if everything you know, every quanta of information you possess
consciously or unconsciously, could be accurately determined just by
asking the right questions? Do you even know all the things that could be
found there? More importantly, who would you trust with the knowledge
of what's in your head? Would you allow your government, your
employer, or your neighbor, access to your thoughts?
What makes you who you are, anyway? Are we the sum of our
actions and our ideas, or is there a deeper essence to our identities? Is
there a difference between our public and private, or our inner and outer
selves? Should the answers to these questions have relevance to the law?
These seemingly far-fetched questions are suddenly and surprisingly
real now that human inquiry and ingenuity have realized the ability to
probe deeper and deeper into the reaches of our cognitive existence.
Advances in modern scientific technique, including a proprietary process
called Brain Fingerprinting have, by some accounts, made it possible to
determine whether an individual possesses specific and detailed
information-Brain Fingerprinting can tell the operator what an
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individual does or does not know without any voluntary action, response
or consent by the subject. While Brain Fingerprinting can't "read minds"
in the absolute sense, it does allow irresistible access to one's thoughts,
with any decision to keep those thoughts and ideas private effectively
overridden by the robustness of the technique.
Brain Fingerprinting is but one example of a larger class of strategies
designed to provide the means to tap into human cognitive contents and
cerebral functioning for information-gathering, rather than clinical
scientific
purposes. Brain
Fingerprinting
relies centrally
on
electroencephalographic (EEG) monitoring; other approaches utilize
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), ocular temperature
fluctuations, infrared (IR) and near infrared (NIR) light detection, or a
combination of some of these technologies simultaneously. The common
thread uniting these complex and varied approaches is the belief that
technological innovation can provide the power to peer behind the veil
that keeps our thoughts and thought processes confidential, and that
developing the power to do so ultimately serves the public good. Because
of the ability to provide access to the individual's cognitive arena, I will
refer to such devices in general as Cognitive Camera Technologies
(CCTs).
There are likely two basic responses to learning of the existence of
CCTs like Brain Fingerprinting and their potential: alarm and elation.
Alarm flows from the recognition that this may be the previouslyunimaginable sunset of democratic liberty and the ideal tool of political
totalitarianism, while elation follows if one focuses on the potential of
the technique to facilitate expedient outcomes in situations, involving law
enforcement or otherwise, where information is the premium asset to be
gained. Regardless of which way opinion sways, the stakes are rather
high in determining what the legal position on CCTs should be.
This legal inquiry unavoidably will be pursued against the backdrop
of our cultural conventions and understandings about what free thought
and mental autonomy mean, and how they relate to our individual and
collective social and political identities. A broad and rich discourse has
taken place across numerous fields of study that begins to derive the
reasons why the sanctity of our minds, and our right to be alone there, is
an a priori assumption in the conceptualization of an open human
society. A consensus has developed around the idea of unfettered and
unmolested cognitive freedom as both descriptive of our natural
condition and normatively superior to the alternatives. The chorus claims
in harmony that the mind is free, and that our thoughts are our own.
From the outset, Brain Fingerprinting and other CCTs raise
questions under the Fourth Amendment's rubric of search and seizure,
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and under the general liberty guarantees of the Due Process Clause The
technology presents a novel context in which these weathered old

provisions must function and, perhaps more importantly, it operates to
force investigation into the theoretical foundation or primary purpose of
the criminal procedure amendments regulating police investigation as a
complex The development of CCTs allows us a fresh opportunity to
inquire into the purpose of these constitutional guarantees and to
evaluate the consequence of the failure to honor them.
It is worth considering what the constitutional outcome would be
should a case arise in which a ruling on the propriety of collecting CCT
evidence were required. According to prevailing understandings of the
Fourth Amendment, the central inquiry would revolve around the
privacy expectations that society would deem reasonable given the
context. This was the innovation of Katz v. United States, and the privacy
norm articulated in that case has become a proxy for the spirit of the
Fourth Amendment itself.' Yet this is not the only way in which we could
seek to answer the question. Another technique for interpreting the
Fourth Amendment is to focus on the nature and function of the
technology that is employed to gather evidence during official
investigations.'
Instead of abstractly inquiring into hypothetical
2. There is also a basic question regarding the admissibility of evidence collected by use of Brain
Fingerprinting, and any other cutting-edge CCTs, in light of the evidentiary standards applied to
scientific information in the courtroom. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
While admissibility concerns are not truly germane to the scope of this Article, a helpful consideration
of the admissibility question is set out in Professor Andre A. Moenssens' article, Brain
Fingerprinting-CanIt Be Used to Detect the Innocence of Persons Chargedwith a Crime?, 70 UMKC
L. REV. 891 (2002).
3. It may be all but obvious that CCTs also raise questions under the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination, and it is true that an analysis of the impact of CCTs from a Fifth
Amendment perspective could advance the larger inquiry initially undertaken in this Article. It is my
intention to take on the Fifth Amendment implications of advancing cognitive camera technology in a
subsequent article. As of this writing, I can merely contend that some of the insights drawn from this
analysis will have an important bearing on evolving Fifth Amendment considerations, and that my
proposed resolution of the instant interpretive debate might offer a similarly effective model for
resolving such interpretive tensions inherent in current Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
4. 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); see also Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New
Model for FourthAmendment Protection,73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 592 (summarizing post-Katz decisions
as evidence that "[tihe holding in Katz forever changed the focus of fourth amendment jurisprudence
from whether the police were, in a literal sense, physically 'searching' a constitutionally protected area
to whether the police were intruding on an individual's expectation of privacy").
5. Cf United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (983) (holding that investigations aided by the
enhanced sensory perceptions of trained narcotics detection dogs, so called "canine sniffs," fall outside
the Fourth Amendment's definition of a search). See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33
(2oo0 ) (expressing its "previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of
ordinary perception" turns mere observation into a Fourth Amendment search); Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (discussing Fourth Amendment protections in the context of surveillance effected
by use of helicopter); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (discussing Fourth Amendment
protections in the context of surveillance effected by use of fixed-wing aircraft); Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (discussing Fourth Amendment protections in the context of

HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 311 2007-2008

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:309

subjective preferences regarding privacy, this approach presumably
externalizes the inquiry by assessing the level of penetration of the
technology, both its penetration into the community and its penetration
6
of meaningful barriers protecting the source of evidence or information.
A final approach to the Fourth Amendment question would center on
simple notions of reasonableness.7 Again eschewing a focus on internal
preferences regarding privacy," and not depending on an assessment of
technological sophistication, the reasonableness approach simply asks
whether it seems fair and appropriate to allow law enforcement to
operate in this fashion.9 A so-called reasonableness test" would likely
weigh the degree of intrusiveness of the search against the strength of the
official justification."
What should the Constitution do in such a circumstance? According

surveillance involving high-resolution long range photographic devices); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 714-16 (1984) (discussing Fourth Amendment protections in the context of surveillance
employing electronic "beepers"); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (same).
6. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
7. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) ("In determining whether a
particular governmental action violates this provision, [the Court] inquire[s] first whether the action
was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer, [the Court] must evaluate the search or seizure under
traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests." (citation omited)); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
656 (995) (upholding warrantless and suspicionless searches of high school students on the grounds
that state's interests in educational order outweighs students' diminished interests in personal privacy
and autonomy); United States v. De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1985) (concluding that
monitoring bowel movement of detained border crossers based upon agents' suspicion of alimentary
canal smuggling need only be, and was, reasonable); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
56o-62 (1976) (holding brief interrogative stops of all motorists crossing certain border checkpoints
are reasonable even without individualized suspicion because of sovereign interest in controlling
entry). For a helpful review of "the rise of reasonableness in Fourth Amendment analysis," see Scott
E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REv. 383,385-86 (1988).
8. See sources cited supra note 4.
9. See sources cited supra note 7.
io.I use the term "test" loosely to describe the reasonableness approach, as the Court has been
less than forthcoming with its articulation of precisely what the outer boundaries are in determining
whether official conduct is reasonable. More problematically, the Court has been unable or unwilling
to provide a clear and comprehensible rule regarding when reasonableness, as opposed to one of the
other two Fourth Amendment alternative tracks, should be the guiding inquiry. See Thomas Y.
Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 742 (I999) (reviewing the
"authentic" historical sources to demonstrate that the framers never intended for a broad
reasonableness standard to govern warrantless intrusions); Leading Cases, 12o HARv. L. REV. 163, 16364 (2oo6) ("The Supreme Court has labored to articulate a consistent framework for assessing
reasonableness, with various Justices arguing that history, common sense, or social norms should
govern the inquiry."); Sundby, supra note 7, at 385 ("Faced with novel fourth amendment questions,
the Court in Camara and Terry turned to a broad reasonableness standard and an ill-defined balancing
test for the immediate solutions.").
II.See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-24, 29-30 (1968).
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to my working model of the Constitution, there are certain absolute
social conditions which the document must maintain, and certain
absolute social conditions which the document must prevent. When
thinking about the Constitution as a whole, and when thinking about the
Bill of Rights in particular, I find it helpful to read the charter as creating
a variety of zones of exclusion, figurative if not physical spaces where the
agents of government, and occasionally the feet of private actors, may
not tread.'2 The Constitution erects fundamental barriers around these
zones, from which an individual or collection of individuals has the
unfettered right to exclude others and in which uninvited actors are
impotent. When the barriers of these constitutional zones of exclusion
are transgressed, the constitutional response should be swift and
unqualified, and the line drawn by way of constitutional interpretation
must be as absolute as is our commitment to preserving or avoiding the
condition itself.
The Constitution's duty to draw and then police these absolute lines
defining and preserving our zones of exclusion serves not only to
preserve our constitutionally-derived rights, but also honors our
fundamental human nature. The non-consensual use of CCTs to invade
human thought intrudes upon one of the zones of exclusion that directly
affects essential human nature. Indeed, the broad social consensus on our
right to a cognitive zone of exclusion reflects the understanding that such
a zone of exclusion is key to our essential humanity, and any legitimate
mode of constitutional interpretation should contend with that essence.
This is the problem sketched in the succeeding pages: the predictive
discussion of what the legal response to the collection of CCT evidence
may be is well out of step with a nuanced normative understanding of
what the legal response should-indeed must-be. The solution
proposed in response to this problem is to revisit and reformulate our
conceptions of the Fourth Amendment's purpose and primary
instrumental orientation, and centrally relies on the articulation of a
newly-developed interpretive framework that emphasizes harmony
between and within ambiguous constitutional provisions.
Part I of this Article summarizes the operational and functional
aspects of Brain Fingerprinting as it currently exists, and considers the
larger implications of Brain Fingerprinting by treating this specific
technology as being merely one concrete iteration of a broader effort to
develop the ability to probe human thought. The purpose of this section
is not only to introduce the technology as part of a larger mind

12. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. Ii, 29 (1905) ("There is... a sphere within which the
individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human
government, especially of any free government existing under a written constitution, to interfere with
the exercise of that will.").
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reading/information gathering arms race, but also to describe in some
detail the ways in which cognitive autonomy may be compromised by
exposure to Brain Fingerprinting or similar CCTs. Part II then takes up
the task of situating CCTs within the larger sociopolitical context created
by our cultural assumptions and beliefs regarding cognitive autonomy.
Part II is expressly a survey of the wide variety of disciplines that have
come to the conclusion that the sanctuary of the human mind is of
inestimable importance to individual identity construction, to
manifestation of a spiritual existence, and to the creation of a functioning
democratic order. Part II is not, therefore, designed to challenge these
conclusions but rather to demonstrate their ubiquity with exemplary
instances-it is unabashedly my intention to evoke the reader's intuitive
understanding that the mind is a safe harbor from which all outsiders can
and should be excluded should we so desire. Of course, one point to be
taken from a reading of these two Parts together is that CCTs thwart our
ability to do so.
Part III of this Article then turns back to the Constitution in order to
determine whether the law can buttress the individual against "hightech" cognitive incursions. The discussion will necessarily focus on the
Fourth Amendment and will assess each of the three available Fourth
Amendment approaches in turn, ultimately concluding that this most
important Amendment will be of little assistance when CCTs eventually
make their way into our daily lives. While the failure of the Fourth
Amendment to preserve our cognitive autonomy may be understood as a
function of the inadequacy of the available tests, it also suggests the
inadequacy of a privacy-based approach to interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. Yet, beyond deriving a tension between the threats posed
by CCTs and prevailing Fourth Amendment principles, it is not my
present intention to deconstruct the
Fourth Amendment's privacy norm
13
or to offer a theoretical alternative.
Finally, Part IV of this Article claims that the Fourth Amendment's
inability to follow where our shared social, religious and political beliefs
lead us is a crisis of constitutional harmony. This Part suggests that the
practical and abstract gulf between the law and our shared assumptions is
an instance that calls for the deployment of holistic constitutional
interpretation or, perhaps even better, for the creation of a model of
"organism-perpetuating" constitutional consistency. Part IV then
concludes the Article with a call to reevaluate our understanding of the
Fourth Amendment and to seek alternative methods of enforcement that
offer greater, more satisfying resolution of these issues.

13. Instead, that effort will be aggressively undertaken in a corollary article to follow forthwith.
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I. BRAIN FINGERPRINTING, CCTs, AND MENTAL SANCTUARY
Technological advancement's tendency to change the way we live,
for better and for worse, is well established. 4 Legal regimes must keep
pace with these changes, and respond with new interpretations or new
iterations of legal standards in order to preserve the balance that the law
promises to society.'5 As the pace and proportion of technological change
increase over time, so must the law's variety and complexity, and so must
our capacity to conceive of old ideas in new ways.' 6 It is the test of our
institutions that they might survive the passing of generations, and it is
the signal of their demise when the law no longer fits a present reality.'7
Analytically, the "new technology" approach and the reasonableness
approach to thinking about the Fourth Amendment are consequential
14. See SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 5 (Wiebe E.
Bijker & John Law eds., 1992) (describing "philosophical studies of the implication of technologies,
and technological modes of rationality, for the character of communication and human interaction");
Dr. Rita R. Colwell, Dir., Nat'l Sci. Found., NSF: Looking Ahead, Address at the Consortium of
Social Sciences Associations Annual Meeting (Dec. 4, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.nsf.gov/news/speeches/colwell/rcoo12o4cossa.htm) ("We humans continually create and
employ technologies. We are doing so today at a pace unmatched in the past. These technologies in
turn have a wide variety of impacts on the humans who use them and on the world in which we live.").
Richard L. Marcus describes the introduction and rise of the computer as the major technological
innovation of the past quarter century and how its wide distribution has resulted in the advent of
discovery of electronically stored information, commonly called E-Discovery. Richard L. Marcus, EDiscovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REV. LrriG. 633, 633-35 (2006). While
technology has historically impacted litigation methods and techniques, "the potential impact of [the
computer] revolution is only now being felt." Id. at 634. Marcus invokes Aldous Huxley's book, BRAVE
NEW WORLD (Harper Perennial) (1932), and George Orwell's book, 1984 (New Am. Library 1961)
(1949), both of which give pre-computer age accounts of a future rife with technological
advancements, reading "[b]oth [to] portray technology as a device to enforce conformity to a
repressive social order." Id. Huxley's book "offered a vision of technology as a seducer" where
"technology controlled almost all aspects of life." Id. Orwell's book offered a vision of "technology as
the enabler of the tyrannical government called Big Brother." Id.
15. See Matter of Daniels, 69 F.R.D 579, 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (finding that witness deposition

could be taken by videotape rather than by normal stenographic methods because "[t]he court should
not be like an ostrich, sticking its head in the sand and being oblivious to advances in technology which
can aid in the judicial process"); Derek T. Conom, Sense-Enhancing Technology and the Search in the
Wake of Kyllo v. United States: Will Prevalence Kill Privacy?, 41 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 749, 774-75
(2005) (arguing that "courts should recognize that the evolution of technology poses unique obstacles

for the continuing viability of a standard that hinges upon the objectively reasonable expectations of
the citizenry, expectations that seem to be continuously less protective of privacy over time"); Marcus,
supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., Laura Hildner, Defusing the Threat of RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy through
Technology-Specific Legislation at the State Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (2006) (discussing
the capacity of the law to keep pace with changing technological realities in the context of Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags).
57. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (recognizing that "changes in the legal and

technological context mean that the [common-law rule on use of deadly force] is distorted almost
beyond recognition when literally applied"); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76
U. COLO. L. REV. 653. 728 (2005) (discussing how congressional changes in copyright law as a reaction
to technological innovation has created market failure, and quoting Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the
Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673,678-79 (2003)).
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alternatives to Katz's privacy approach-alternatives designed to either

effectuate or improve upon that privacy foundation-but none of the
available approaches adequately protects our humanity. This realization
begins to suggest a shortcoming in the Fourth Amendment that explains
its inability to adequately deal with the threat of CCTs, and begins to

suggest alternative modes for conceiving of the Fourth Amendment that
avoid privacy's pitfalls.

A.

WHAT'S ON YOUR MIND?

The possession and control of information produces political
power,'" and governments have always used their ability to gather and
restrict the flow of information to influence the outcome of social

events.'9 This is true when the government is fighting wars, seeking reelection, or discharging its law enforcement obligations. 0 In fact, it may
be particularly true that information is the key asset in the effort to fight
crime.' Whether it be described as "proof," that kind of information we
i8. See, e.g., Katherine S. Williams, On-Line Anonymity, Deindividuation and Freedom of
Expression and Privacy, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 687, 689 (2006) ("Particularly in our information era,
political power and authority is heavily interwoven with the dissemination of information (or the
control of its dissemination).").
19. Id. (suggesting that "[t]his interweaving of power and information or knowledge is not new
and was the reason for the early control of the printing press through licensing and the use of seditious
libel").
20. See generally NANCY F. CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A HOST OF TONGUES: LANGUAGE
COMMUNIES INTHE UNITED STATES 70 (1983); English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in
the States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 330-31 n.36 (i99i) ("Throughout the First
and Second World Wars, language prejudice against Germans and Japanese was codified in state laws
which sought to restrict information transmission and force assimilation through English language
acquisition."); Joshua Bosin, Miami's Mambo: The "Cuba Affidavit" & Unconstitutional Cultural
Censorship in an Embargo Regime, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 75, 104 n.189 (2004) (explaining
that "[w]ithout an airing of the widest range of views and information, governmental actions are
shielded from proper review and evaluation, resulting in the concentration of political power in the
hands of dictatorial authorities"); E.E. (Bo) Edwards, Evidence in the Court of Public Policymaking,
CHAMPION, June 2004, at 4 (arguing that the Bush administration enacted the USA PATRIOT Act and
other policies that significantly expand government power at the expense of individual rights by
engaging in the following strategies: (i) providing exceedingly limited information; (2) appealing to
people's deeply held fears, emotions, and values; (3) accusing those seeking more information about
their decisions of threatening the safety of the entire nation; and (4) using raw political power to
silence dissent).
21. See Jeff Breinholt, Seeking Synchronicity: Thoughts on the Role of Domestic Law
Enforcement in Counterterrorism,21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 157, I6o (2005) (grounding his thesis "on
the well-established notion that intelligence-raw information-is the key to preventing bad things
from happening"); Al Baker & Sewell Chan, New Devices Will Search for Explosives in Subways, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2005, at B3 (reporting that New York City Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly
"continues to push for technological advances in the police force" because he believes that
"[i]nformation is the key to so much in policing and law enforcement"); Carl Hulse & Kate Zernike,
Threats and Responses; House Passes Detainee Bill as it Clears Senate Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2oo6, at A2o

(quoting Representative Mac Thornberry,

Republican of Texas, as saying that

"[ilnformation is the key weapon we have to prevent [terror suspects] from killing us and prevent
[terror suspects] from attacking others in the future").
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call evidence that might be used to secure a criminal conviction, or as a
"tip" or a "lead," that kind of information that might be used to
intervene in future criminal activity, the data set that is human activity
and individual knowledge is essential to the operation of our criminal
justice system.
This means that there will always be an incentive to develop new
ways to gather information, to test its validity, and to extract it from
those who might keep it concealed." Whether comparing the earliest use
of telescopes, 3 and then binoculars,24 to recent advances in long-range
digital vision enhancement25 and thermal imaging scopes," or the
rudimentary
stages of eavesdropping" to modern high-frequency wave
28
scanners, there is a persistent trend toward increased informationgathering capacity. The government grows ever more aware of our
actions and behaviors," and ever more capable of piercing veils of

22. Hildner, supra note 16;
see also supra note 16 and accompanying text; cf.Erwin Chemerinsky,
Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L.
Rev. i619, 1621-27 (2004) (construing both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the USA
PATRIOT Act as official government responses to the perceived need to augment law enforcement's
information-gathering capacity).
23. Albert Van Helden, The Galileo Project, http://galileo.rice.edu/sci/instruments/telescope.html
(describing the telescope as "the first extension of one of man's senses," one which "helped shift
authority in the observation of nature from men to instruments") (last visited Nov. 22, 2007).
24. Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through
Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1409 n.43 (2002)
(comparing Fourth Amendment cases where binoculars were employed to collect evidence); Michael
W.
Davidson,
Molecular
Expressions,
http://micro.magnet.fsu.eduloptics/activities/students/
scopes.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2007) (documenting the history and impact of the development of
binoculars).
25. Dow Chem. Co v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986) ("[The] EPA employed a
commercial aerial photographer, using a standard floor-mounted precision aerial mapping camera, to
take photographs of [Dow Chemical's two thousand-acre facility in Midland, Michigan].").
26. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
27. See generally Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506, 512 (i961) (holding that a search
occurred when officers eavesdropped by gaining lawful access to a row house and employing a "spike
mike" to listen to what was going on within the four walls of the house next door); David J. Kirschner,
The NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program: Is it Worth the Risk?, 40 THE PROSECUTOR 42, 43 (2006)
(discussing generally executive authority to conduct "warrantless eavesdropping against spies and
foreign enemy powers," and documenting President Franklin Roosevelt's authorization of the use of
wiretaps on national security grounds during World War II).
28. Peter J. Sampson, After $8B, Gaping Holes in Security; Experts Say Another Attack is
Inevitable, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept. 7, 2006, at Aoi (describing the New York-New Jersey
PATH train system as the testing ground for the first generation of high-tech anti-terror screening
devices to be used at rail facilities, including "electromagnetic wave scanners that can 'see' bombs or
weapons under clothing").
29. See Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: BalancingNational Security with Privacy Under the
USA PATRIOTAct, 8o DENV. U. L. REV. 375,376 (2002) (expressing concern about expansions in the
government's authority to conduct clandestine surveillance); Shawn Mitchell, U.S. Representative of
Colorado, How Far Have We Come Since September ilth, 200?,
Speech at the Denver University
Law Review Symposium (Mar. 5, 2004), reprinted in 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 749, 755-77 (2004)
(considering the argument that section 21 5 of the USA PATRIOT Act has a chilling effect on what
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subjective secrecy.3" This process both feeds and flows from the
development of technology for general, private purposes, and generates
its own market for commercial enterprise.'
The development of new scientific expertise and innovative
applications of technology cannot but make the job of law enforcement
easier.32 This is not to say that access to the technology is necessarily
affordable, but any device which improves the ability to detect, prevent,
and prove the occurrence of crime will yield a net savings to the
efficiency of the policing industry.33 As long as budgets can keep pace,
law enforcement leaders will consistently press for an increasingly
sophisticated toolbox of technological solutions. 4 This pressure is
compounded by the increasing realization that those who engage in
crime often rely on sophisticated information control networks to
achieve their illicit purposes.3" Whether it involves ordinary individual
criminal conduct, domestic financial criminal syndicates, or supercriminal terrorist cells, the reliance by law-breakers on information
controls necessitates law enforcement's focus on penetrating closed
information circuits. Much like the argument for upgrading the tactical

you read when you go to the library or bookstore due to the government's surveillance and subpoena
powers); Tom Hays, Does Big Brother Have Too Many Eyes?, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 2005, at 7A
(reporting on the growing number of surveillance cameras in the borough of Manhattan in New York
City and discussing results of a project by the New York Civil Liberties Union in which four thousand
surveillance cameras were counted in a canvassing of less than one quarter of the borough).
30. Mell, supra note 29; Mitchell, supra note 29; Hays, supra note 29.
31. See Eric Lipton, Security Post Would Put Kerik atop Field That Enriched Him, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2004, at Ai (describing how one former New York City police commissioner, Bernard B.
Kerik, was involved in the commercial success of Taser International, the manufacturer of Tasersnon-lethal devices adopted in recent years by over six thousand law enforcement agencies-which
experienced a ten-fold increase in sales revenue between the years 2001 and 2004).
32. This general advantage is certainly mitigated by the fact that law enforcement departments
are forced to keep pace with the increasingly sophisticated use of technology by criminal actors. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY-ARE SMALL AND RURAL AGENCIES EQUIPPED
AND TRAINED? 1 (2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/2046o9.pdf. Nevertheless, all
things being equal, greater access to technological innovation should lead to higher levels of
effectiveness as a general trend.
33. See Amanda Hoey, Techno-Cops: Information Technology and Law Enforcement, 6 INT'L J.L.
& INFO. TECH. 69 (1998).
34. See Fingerprint Machines for Drivers 'Not Big Brother,' N. ECHO (England), Nov. 23, 2006, at
3 (discussing police trials of hand-held electronic fingerprint reader and quoting Barry Taylor, Deputy
Chief Constable of Dyfed-Powys Police, as saying that "[tihis is just another tool in the toolbox to help
officers to identify individuals. There's an awful lot of concern and discussion about civil liberties and
the use of technology at the moment but we are all members of the public at the end of the day").
35. See Carlo Morselli, Pierre Tremblay, & Bill McCarthy, Mentors and Criminal Achievement, 44
CRIMINOLOGY 17, 20 (2006). There is of course an inherent need for secrecy or confidentiality in
criminal contexts. Id. Many criminal actors are increasingly turning to, and benefiting from,
technological developments to advance their desire to thwart detection and identification. See
generally Dorothy E. Denning & William E. Baugh, Jr., Encryption and Evolving Technologies: Tools
of Organized Crime and Terrorism (1997), available at http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/-denning/
crypto/oc-rpt.txt.
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weaponry of police forces , upgrading their technological armaments
proceeds on the premise that officials must stay "one step ahead" of their
criminal quarry.
Law enforcement institutions will therefore continually be seeking
greater advantage in the effort to prevent people from engaging in
criminal activity and successfully keeping that fact concealed." Long ago,
that search led to the invention of the first functional lie detector testing
protocol,"' and now modern studies are revolutionizing the old lie
detection concept. While the lie detectors already familiar to the law are
based on the physiological responses of a test subject to a structured
series of questions," new innovations in neurotechnologies are allowing
investigators to use brain imaging to assess the cognitive and affective
processes manifest by a test subject."a The instrumentation differences
between the old and new devices lead to utilization of different standards
for assessing deception on the part of the test subject,4' and arguably
36. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S1864-oi (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1989) (statement of William Pattison,
Executive Vice President, National Association of Police Organizations) ("The availability of, and
access to, assault weapons by criminals has become so substantial that police forces are being forced to
upgrade the weapons supplied to police officers merely as a matter of self-defense and selfpresentation."); Remarks Before the United States House of Representatives' Select Committee on
Narcotics Abuse and Control: Assault Weapons and Drug Enforcement, Iolst Cong. 121 (1989)
(testimony of Darrel W. Stephens, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum) ("Their
[Police Executive Research Forum members] regular encounters with the corrosive effects of drug
abuse have become more dangerous, because drug traffickers and abusers have turned to
semiautomatic assault guns as their weapons of choice.").
37. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 32.

38. Mary Bellis, Police Technology and Forensic Science, http://inventors.about.com/
od/fstartinventions/a/forensic.2.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2007) ("An earlier and less successful lie
detector or polygraph machine was invented by James Mackenzie in 19o2. However, the modern
polygraph machine was invented by John Larson in 1921. . . . Used in police interrogation and
investigation since 1924, the lie detector is still controversial among psychologists, and is not always
judicially acceptable.").
39. Id. ("The theory is that when a person lies, the lying causes a certain amount of stress that
produces changes in several involuntary physiological reactions. A series of different sensors are
attached to the body (and] the operator asks a series of control questions that set the pattern of how
an individual responds when giving true and false answers. Then the actual questions are asked, mixed
in with filler questions.").
40. Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for
Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 510 (2006) ("It is the recent technological changes in
brain imaging, particularly the visualization of the brain while it is actively working-so-called
'functional imaging'-that have allowed cognitive neuroscience the potential to identify relatively
subtle processes such as deception. Moreover, the ability to examine in real time the response of the
subject brain during a question and answer session makes it feasible to use this technique forensically,
so long as the pattern of brain activity corresponding to deception is sufficiently well-characterized.").
41. Paul Root Wolpe et al., Emerging Neurotechnologiesfor Lie-Detection:Promises and Perils,
AM. J. BioETHics, Mar. 2005, at 39, 40 (2005) (describing the two prototype paradigms that have been

used to generate instances of truth-telling and deception to be subjected to measurement: (I) "the
comparison question test (known in polygraph literature as the control question test, COT), which
forms the basis of conventional polygraphy"; and (2) "the guilty knowledge test (GKT), which seeks to
determine the salience ('attentional value') of information to a subject by comparing his or her

HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 319 2007-2008

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:309

produces statistically significant differences in the observable error rates
between the two. 4 When it comes to lie detection and knowledge
concealment, it appears that scientists may be on the verge of building
the better mousetrap.43
Brain Fingerprinting is simply the trade name given by Dr.
Lawrence Farwell to one such trap.' Brain Fingerprinting is the process
of using a complex of neural imaging devices to measure and record
brain responses to certain pre-selected stimuli.45 These brain wave
responses are known as "event related potentials (ERPs)" because they
are produced as a result of the brain having been exposed to a particular
event. 46 The pattern of these ERPs can be correlated to different
knowledge states and produces a body of comparative data that allows
responses to 'relevant' and 'neutral' questions.... Whereas the CQT involves measurement of
physiological or psychophysical responses to classify a response as a lie, the GKT uses such responses
to indicate the presence of concealed knowledge.").
42. Id.
43. See Ian Sample, The Brain Scan That Can Read People's Intentions, THE GUARDIAN
(England), Feb. 9, 2007, at I, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2oo7/feb/o9/
neuroscience.ethicsofscience. To make matters even more complex, there are already new innovations
in CCTs that are moving beyond the current focus on lie detection and knowledge concealment, and
reaching into the realm of human intention. Id. A device currently being developed by a coalition of
scientists from the Max Planck Institute for Human and Brain Sciences in Germany, University
College London, and Cambridge University has shown the capacity "to look deep inside a person's
brain and read their intentions before they act." Id. "'Using the scanner, we could look around the
brain for ... information and read out something that from the outside there's no way you could
possibly tell is in there. It's like shining a torch around, looking for writing on a wall."' Id. (quoting
Professor John-Dylan Hynes). Recent empirical testing of the device involved subjects who were
asked to decide whether to add or subtract two numbers, and then had their brains scanned with an
fMRI device. Id. The researchers identified "a signature" in the subjects' prefrontal cortex that
allowed them to predict the subjects' intent-to add or subtract-with an accuracy rate of 70%. Id.
While these type of intentions at present seem simple, and while a solid baseline for comparison is
necessary to make accurate predictions, "it's just a matter of time" before these limiting factors are
overcome by additional advances in scientific understanding. Id. ("'For some of these techniques, it's
just a matter of time.... A lot of neuroscientists in the field are very cautious and say we can't talk
about reading individuals' minds, and right now that is very true, but we're moving ahead so rapidly,
it's not going to be that long before we will be able to tell whether someone intended to do a crime
with a certain degree of certainty."' (quoting Professor Barbara Sahakian)).
44. See Mark Hansen, Truth to Tell: Attorneys for a Murder Suspect Say Brain Fingerprinting
Proves His Innocence, A.B.A. J., May 2004, at 18; Moenssens, supra note 2;Sara Solovitch, Mind
Reader, LEGAL AFF., Dec. 2004, at 66.
45. Solovitch, supra note 44.Solovitch describes how Brain Fingerprinting works:
A headband of electrodes is placed on a subject, who watches words or pictures flash across
a computer screen. Some of the images are meant to stimulate memories, which cause the
brain to fire off an electrical response 300 milliseconds after the stimulus ....The stimuli
come in three categories: "target" stimuli (details of an activity that would be known to the
subject), irrelevant stimuli (which would not be expected to elicit a response), and "probe"
stimuli (phrases or pictures supposedly known only to a select few, like the perpetrator and
investigators of a crime). If a suspect exhibits a p3oo response to a probe stimulus, he is
presumed guilty. If not, he is presumed innocent.
Id.
46. Moenssens, supra note 2, at 893 (explaining that an "ERP is a scientific term that describes
the electrical wave form emitted by the brain after it has absorbed the external event").
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the operator to identify either general deception or the possession of
specific relevant information.47 Unlike traditional lie detectors, Brain
Fingerprinting does not rely on outward physical responses of the
subject, such as heart rate and blood pressure fluctuations, but instead
targets a specific ERP in the brain occurring 300 milliseconds after the
event exposure (the P3oo wave)." In the so-called P3oo effect, the brain
will manifest this specific wave pattern in response to "relevant" stimuli.49
Relevant stimuli include those that are familiar to the subject and also
those that are presented in a surprising way given the context." In
essence, the P3oo effect demonstrates the subject's exposure to
"noteworthy" information, and the absence of a P3oo wave demonstrates
the "irrelevance" of the stimuli, indicating that the stimuli are not
familiar or not significant to the subject.I
Discovery of and research into the P300 wave significantly pre-dates
Brain Fingerprinting's more modern influence, having been established
scientifically as early as I965." Dr. Farwell's innovation on strict P3oo
usage involves measuring a slightly longer sample of brain wave activity,
from 300 to 8oo milliseconds, which is an ERP he believes reflects a more
complete sampling of the cognitive processing that occurs in response to
a relevant stimuli. 3 It is this longer ERP pattern, between 300 and 8oo
milliseconds, which is at the heart of Brain Fingerprinting as a
proprietary method and the basis of what he calls his Memory-andEncoding-Related-Multifaceted-Electroencephalographic-Reponse
(MERMER) signal. 4 Research appears to support the claim that
monitoring the MERMER signal is highly accurate; the MERMER

47. Id. ("An ERP measurement is the recognition of specific patterns of electrical brain activity in
a subject that are indicative that certain cognitive brain activities occurred when the person was
exposed to a stimulus in the form of an image or a concept expressed in words.").
48. Id. at 894-95 (indicating that Dr. Farwell "began to perceive that the P3 oo was not simply an
isolated sensory brain effect, but was part of a larger complex of phenomena that continued to take
place after the initial P3oo had occurred. This extended response had to do, he believed, with the
cognitive processing that occurs slightly beyond the P3oo wave and continuing in the range of 300-800
milliseconds after the introduction of a stimulus. It is this perception that led to the development of his
own MERMER effect."); Solovitch, supra note 44, at 66.
49. Moenssens, supra note 2, at 894 ("The P3 oo is a specific event-related brain potential. It could
be designated also as a specific pattern of brain wave activity in tie subject being tested that occurs
when information related to a specific event is recognized by the brain as being significant or
surprising in the context in which it is being offered. The P3oo, then, is a brain 'potential' that handles
sensory processing.").
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 895 (Dr. Samuel Sutton and his collaborators discovered the P3 00 in 1965).
53. Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing to Detect Knowledge
Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC Scu., 135, 136 (2OOt), available at
http://www.brainfingerprinting.org (select "Research" hyperlink; then select "Journal of Forensic
Sciences" hyperlink).
54. Id. at 137.
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response "is elicited when the brain processes case-relevant information
that it recognizes, and is absent when the brain does 55not recognize, or
does not exhibit any surprise at the case-relevant data.
In practical terms, Brain Fingerprinting entails strapping a sensorladen headband on the test subject, and monitoring those electrode
sensors with an electroencephalogram (EEG).56 The EEG data is fed into
a computer, which processes the data according to an analytical
algorithm and then provides a graphic reproduction of the wave pattern
thus analyzed. 7 The EEG data itself is merely the electrical signals
triggered in the subject brain in response to the stimuli of the testing
protocol. According to its inventor, the Brain Fingerprinting test
protocol requires that the subject be seated before a video screen which
will display a series of words or images to the subject."' The words or
images displayed must be carefully chosen in order to evoke and isolate
the significant brain wave patterns, and are classified as "targets,"
"irrelevants," and "probes."59 Targets are images or information that
would be noteworthy to, and thus provoke a P3oo and MERMER
response in, all subjects." By contrast, "irrelevants," or non-target
stimulants, have no relation to the occurrence or issue that is the subject
of the test and thus do not produce a P300 or MERMER response even
though an innocent person might speculate or even presume them to be
related to the crime. Finally, "probes" are those bits of information that
would appear as irrelevant to all subjects except those with knowledge of
or a connection to the crime being investigated. Innocent people with
no connection to the crime, or who lack the relevant knowledge
regarding the crime, would be unable to differentiate between the probe
and other irrelevants and would therefore demonstrate neither a
MERMER signal nor its included P300 wave. 63 "But not so for the
person who possesses actual knowledge of the event being examined. To
that individual, the probe would be meaningfully connected to the event
and MERMER would be recorded. ' 64 By this method, Brain
55. Moenssens, supra note 2, at 894.

56. See Method and Apparatus for Multifaceted Electroencephalographic Response Analysis
(MERA), U.S. Patent No. 5,363,858 (filed May 5, 1993); Method and Apparatus for Truth Detection,
U.S. Patent No. 5,406,956 (filed Feb. ii,1993); Method for Electroencephalographic Information
Detection, U.S. Patent No. 5,467,777 (filed Sept. 15, 1994).
57. See sources cited supra note 56.
58. See sources cited supra note 56.
59. Farwell, supra note 53, at 136-37; Moenssens, supra note 2, at 896-97.
60. To achieve this uniform response, test operators choose an image that is universally
recognized, like the Statue of Liberty or, perhaps, a branded item like a Coca-Cola bottle. See Farwell,
supra note 53, at 137.

61. Farwell, supra note 53, at 137; Moenssens, supra note 2, at 897.
62. Farwell, supra note 53, at 137; Moenssens, supra note 2, at 897.
63. Farwell, supra note 53, at 137; Moenssens, supra note 2, at 897.
64. Moenssens, supra note 2, at 897; accord Farwell, supra note 53, at 137 ("For a subject who has
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Fingerprinting allows the operator to confirm the presence or absence of
specific knowledge or information in the cerebral history of the suspect. 6
It should be pointed out that Brain Fingerprinting, as a specific
proprietary forensic method, is open to critique. Both the neurological
basis of the MERMER effect, and the accuracy of information gathered
by use of the Brain Fingerprinting protocol, have not received ioo%
acceptance in the scientific community and are being subjected to further
clinical testing.6 Moreover, there has already been initial testing and
analysis by the government of Brain Fingerprinting's utility,6, and a
report prepared by the United States General Accounting Office for
Senator Charles Grassley that recognized significant obstacles to its
widespread implementation." It is not at all clear that Brain
Fingerprinting would meet the standards of evidentiary admissibility
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,69 and its progeny,"

participated in the situation in question, the Probes are noteworthy due to the subject's knowledge of

that situation, and, therefore, Probes elicit a MERMER when the subject is knowledgeable.").
65. Farwell, supra note 53, at 137.
66. See Slaughter v. State, 1o5 P.3d 832, 834-35 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (concluding that there
was no real evidence in that case that Brain Fingerprinting has been extensively tested, that it has been
presented and analyzed in numerous peer-review articles in recognized scientific publications, that it
has a very low rate of error, that it has objective standards to control its operation, or that it is
generally accepted within the "relevant scientific community"); Moenssens, supra note 2, at 917
(noting that "while the P3oo effect .. .is widely accepted as valid in the scientific community," the
MERMER technique lacks full support by the scientific community "due, in part, to the fact that Dr.
Farwell has patented his technology and has been reluctant to make his computer programs available
to others for independent testing. This reluctance may be due to fear of compromising what he
believes to be proprietary methodology").
67. See Lawrence A. Farwell, Detection of FBI Agents Using Brain Fingerprinting Technology:
A New Paradigm for Psychophysiological Detection of Concealed Information, May 7, 1993-updated
Mar. 2003, http://www.brainfingerprinting.org (select "Research" hyperlink; then select "FBI Study"
hyperlink).
68. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPORT 02-22, INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES: FEDERAL
AGENCY VIEWS ON THE POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF "BRAIN FINGERPRINTING" 8-13 (2OOI), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do222.pdf.
69. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Compare Cassandra H. Welch,
Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert's Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
IO85 (2006) (reflecting on the fact that the exact standard for the admission of expert testimony
remains uncertain and courts have had little opportunity to reconsider the redefined standard of

admissibility because evidentiary decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion), and Moenssens,
supra note 2, at 920 (arguing that because the underlying methodology of MERMER technology is
derived from solid, well-accepted science, it could be possible that a court exercising the DaubertKumho Tire "gatekeeping" function would rule the testimony admissible), with Jennifer Wolsing,
Daubert's Erie Problem, 82 IND. L.J. 183 (2007) (discussing how the Daubert ambiguity has resulted in
at least six state courts in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits having pronouncedly more lenient standards
of evidence admissibility than their federal counterparts which results in forum shopping), and
Slaughter, 105 P.3d. at 836 (holding that Brain Fingerprinting, based solely upon the MERMER effect,
would not survive a Daubert analysis).
70. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that Daubert's
"gatekeeping" obligations, requiring an inquiry into both relevance and reliability, applies not only to

"scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony); United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998)
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and it has only made its way into the record of a smattering of trial
proceedings.7' It is fair to say that, based on the limited scientific and
official embrace of this particular commercial product, the time when
brain scans are a routine investigative technique is not on our nearest
horizon. However, the likelihood that we will witness such technological
competence or capacity within a reasonable period of time necessitates
reflection upon these constitutional matters.72
Moreover, Brain Fingerprinting relies on only one of several
available methods able to bypass the peripheral nervous system, "the
usual way in which we communicate information[,] and gain direct access
to the seat of a person's thoughts, feelings, intentions, or knowledge."73
Other methods include functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
ocular thermal scanning or photography, and infrared (IR) or near
infrared (NIR) light detection technologies.74 While each of these has the

(holding that per se rule against admission of polygraph evidence in court-martial proceedings did not
violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights of accused to present defense); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (holding that the "abuse of discretion" standard applies to District Court's
decisions to exclude scientific evidence).
71. Compare Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003) (reversing conviction in action
for post-conviction relief for first-degree murder where defendant claimed newly discovered evidence
in the form of a police report containing "novel computer-based testing," but while the lower court
appears to have admitted the evidence under non-Daubertcircumstances, the test did not ultimately
factor into the Iowa Supreme Court's reason for reversing the conviction), and Slaughter, 105 P.3d. at
836 (holding that Brain Fingerprinting, based solely upon the MERMER effect, would not survive a
Daubert analysis), with Solovitch, supra note 44, at 66 (describing a situation involving James B.
Grinder, a primary suspect for over fifteen years in the murder of Julie Helton in Macon County,
Missouri, who underwent a Brain Fingerprinting test which indicated, with a statistical confidence
level of 99.9%, that the specific details of the crime were recorded in Grinder's brain after which
Grinder pled guilty to rape and murder in exchange for a life sentence without parole).
72. It is often the case that what begins as speculation, or even science fiction, ends up as
scientific reality. One example that bears consideration is the early social imagination regarding
cloning. See MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK (Random House I99O) (a novel turned Hollywood
blockbuster (Universal Studios 1993) that spawned scores of symposia and congressional debates
about the possibility of cloning a long dead extinct creature from DNA samples); ALDOUs HUXLEY, A
BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper 1998) (1932) (a utopian novel where cloning is used to solve the human
resource problem by altering and controlling genes to produce humans as needed for the "perfect
society"); IRA LEVIN, THE Boys FROM BRAZIL (Bantam 1991) (976) (a story which was captured in a
1978 movie starring Gregory Peck and Laurence Olivier about a group of modern day, post-WWII
neo-Nazis cloning Hitler), and the present reality wherein cloning is at least a limited but functioning
technique. See, e.g., UK Scientists Clone Human Embryo, BBC NEWS, May 20, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/45636o7.stm. Another, more pulpy example, is the communicator
carried by the characters in the 196os television program Star Trek. (NBC 1966). Anyone even
remotely familiar with that program will recognize that the communicator cum cellular phone is
imaginative fantasy made real.
73. Wolpe et al., supra note 41, at 39.
74. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is the use of MRI to trace the flow of blood
around the brain. It is one of the most recently developed forms of neuroimaging. See generally G.
Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL
CORTEX 830 (2003), available at http://cercor.oxfordjoumals.org/cgi/content/abstract/13/8/83o; Aiden P.
Gregg, When Vying Reveals Lying: The Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer, 21 APPLIED
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capacity to reveal information contained and processes taking place
within the brain, none can truly read your mind-yet. 7 The point is that
these accumulated technologies are the incremental iterations of the
larger race to develop the ability to do so-a development that is all but
certain to occur-and the race is well underway. 6
Indeed, these CCTs fall within a larger category of technological
approaches that might be called cognitive landscape interferers (CLIs). 7
These broader strategies for controlling the cognitive processes of human
beings go beyond probing thoughts and knowledge, and may entail
specific direction or prevention of human thought and knowledge. One
strategy already being employed, with the blessings of the United States
Supreme Court, is the forced administration of psychotropic medication
to defendants deemed too mentally ill 78
to participate in their criminal trial
without pharmacological intervention. While the forced medication may
make the defendant easier to manage in the confines of courtroom
decorum, it may also distort the defendant's internal cognitive
environment in a way that is unfamiliar and unnatural to him. 79 A similar,
if not more egregious practice is the administration of psychotropic
medication designed to break down individual will and reduce resistance
to questioning."' The application of so-called "truth serums" has been
PSYCHOL. 621 (2006); James W. Prichard & Lawrence M. Brass, New Horizons in
Neurology: New Anatomical and FunctionalImaging Methods, 32 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 395 (1992).
75. Sample, supra note 43 ("'We shouldn't go overboard about the power of these techniques at
the moment, but what you can be absolutely sure of is that these will continue to roll out and we will
have more and more ability to probe people's intentions, minds, background thoughts, hopes and
emotions."' (quoting Professor Colin Blakemore)).
76. Pdivi Oinas & Edward J. Malecki, The Evolution of Technologies in Time and Space: From
National and Regional to Spatial and Innovation Systems, 25 INT'L REGIONAL Sci. REV. 102 (2002)
(discussing how the cyclical processes in the evolution of technologies keep technological trajectories
or paths moving in one direction for a period of time).
77. I use this phrase to refer to those devices or technologies that are capable of disrupting the
"normal" solitude, pure subjectivity, and sense of absolute agency that characterizes human thought
and perception. Here, I ask the reader to be my data, and to reflect on her own experience to
appreciate the totalizing nature of internal consciousness. I suggest that when we "think about how we
think," we assume that our thoughts come from within, we proceed as though what we perceive is, and
insist that even if we are told what to think we cannot be forced to do so. Of course, there are caveats
and exceptions to these broad assertions. For example, I do not mean to suggest that persons suffering
from mental illness that causes auditory hallucinations are anything less than fully constituted human
beings. Rather, by the very title of mental illness we recognize that perceiving more than one source
for the ideas we entertain is a pathological state frequently requiring extensive treatment and therapy.
78. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, i8o (2003) (holding that in order to permit involuntary
administration of drugs solely for trial-competence purposes a court must first find that important
governmental interests are at stake); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-25 (i9o) (reasoning
that the right to be free from medication has to be balanced against the state's duty to treat mentally ill
inmates and run a safe prison).
COGNITIVE

79. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1992) (describing the subtle yet debilitating effects

that forced psychotropic medication can have on a defendant subjected to such practices).
8o. J.R. Romanko, Truth Extraction, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 19, 2000, at 54; Amanda
Schaffer, What a Long Strange Trip It's Been, SLATE, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.slate.comid/2158i44
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documented as part of the current military actions in the Middle East,8'
and the ethical consequences of physician involvement in that
interrogation has been openly debated by the American Psychiatric
Association and others8' Of most urgent alarm may be the development
of hypersonic sound projectors that create a field of wave energy that
operates directly on the auditory perceptive centers in the brain.83 As an
individual passes through this field, the projected information will be
"heard" instantly inside the brain of the target-thoughts and words,
commercial jingles, even inappropriate commands will appear indigenous
to the subject. 8
The legal significance of each type of CLI can and should receive
significant debate, and each demands its own tailored legal response, but
(stating that in the 1950S the U.S. Army conducted research on MDMA, otherwise known as ecstasy,
as a potential incapacitant or truth serum, but apparently dropped the idea).
8I. See Memorandum from Amnesty Int'l to the U.S. Att'y Gen. (Nov. I, 2ooi) (available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR5i I702001)
(regarding Amnesty
International's
concerns relating to the post-September ii investigations and noting these techniques would violate
human rights treaties to which the United States is a party).
82. In fact, a new policy prohibiting physicians' participation in interrogation of prisoners and
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and elsewhere was passed after the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law gave detailed suggestions and comments to the American Medical
Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. See Press Release, New Policy Against
Physicians
Participating
in
Interrogations
(June
12,
2oo6),
(available
at
http://
www.psych.org/news-room/press-releases/o6-4iNewAMAPolicyonPhysiciansandDetainees.pdf);
see
also Michael K. Gottlieb, Executions and Torture: The Consequences of Overriding Professional
Ethics, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHIcs 351, 353 (2006) ("[S]trong evidence that doctors ignored,
justified, or even helped in the humiliation, degradation, and physical abuse of Iraqi detainees at Abu
Ghraib has shocked many in both the medical and non-medical communities. Mounting evidence
suggests that physicians ... [engaged in] activities in contravention of international law and medical
ethics.").
83. Instead of using vibrating membrane like traditional speakers, this technology electronically
converts audible tones into a pair of ultrasonic waves at frequencies far beyond human hearing.
However, when the ultrasonic waves interact after being processed by Norris's invention, they
reproduce the original audible frequency; however, since it is being carried by those ultrasonic signals,
it is highly directional. That means you can effectively "shine" a spot of sound where you want it. Jame
Reno & N'Gai Croal, Hearing is Believing, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 2002, at 44, available at
http://www.woodynorris.com/Articles/Newsweek3.htm. Woody Norris has invented both a crowd
control tool, called the Long Range Acoustical Device (LRAD), and the display audio technology,
called the HyperSonic Sound (HSS). In fact, LRAD has been used by the U.S. military in Iraq because
when in weapon mode, LRAD blasts a tightly controlled stream of caustic sound that can be turned up
to high enough levels to trigger nausea or possibly fainting. Amanda Onion, Listen Up: Unusual Forms
of
Sound
to
Emanate
from
RNC,
ABCNEws.coM,
Aug.
25,
2004,
http://abcnews.go.comiTechnology/story?id=99472&page= I.
84. Kevin Maney, Sound Technology Turns the Way You Hear on Its Ear, USA TODAY, May 20,
(2003), at iB, available at http://www.usatoday.com/techlnews/techinnovations/2oo3-o5-i9-hss-X.htm;
Marsha Sella, The Sound of Things to Come, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 23, 2003, at 34 (describing
the various ways that Woody Norris, the founder of HSS technology, contemplates using the
technology); Clive Thompson, There's a Sucker Born in Every Medial Prefontal Cortex, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE,
Oct.
26,
2003,
at
54, available at http://www.cognitiveliberty.orglneuro/
neuromarketingnyt.html.
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the net result of the existence of these questionable techniques is the
creation of a marketplace for mind penetration. In a wide variety of
circumstances, just a few of which are described here, there will be

incentive if not arguably legitimate need for government (and private)
actors to access and manipulate the public's thoughts, knowledge, and
cognitive affective states. The unrelenting general trend toward evergreater information-gathering ability suggests that this official quest for
the ability to probe the mind, in both lie detection and other cognitive
data collection contexts, will likewise escalate and produce continued
scientific and technical innovation.
B.

WHITHER COGNITIVE AUTONOMY

Given the depths which Brain Fingerprinting and eventually-realized
CCTs may probe and record neurological processes, it is important to
understand the extent to which the use of such technologies can interfere
with the mental or thought processes to which we have become
accustomed. On the simplest level, CCTs will have a chilling effect on

our imagination."

We cannot often anticipate where our mental

explorations will take us. 86 Perhaps we imagine ourselves engaging in87
behavior which is illegal, immoral, or at least socially unacceptable.
These fantasies we might entertain are often not a true reflection of our
character or our intentions, but the world of imagination operates as our
field of experimentation8 so that we might express and metabolize those

85. It is rather easy to see how the possibility of discovery may change what we are willing to
entertain on the mind's stage. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Freedom of Thought, Offensive Fantasiesand the
Fundamental Human Right to Hold Deviant Ideas: Why the Seventh Circuit Got It Wrong in Doe v.
City of Lafayette, Indiana, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 125, 140 (2005) ("[Tjhe chilling effect of this ruling, i.e.,
that the communication of one's thoughts may result in being banned from public spaces, is
frightening.").
86. In fact, an entire field of Psychotherapy has developed called Cognitive Behavior Therapy
that is based on modifying everyday thoughts and behaviors, with the aim of positively influencing

emotions. See, e.g.,

JUDITH BECK, COGNITIVE THERAPY: BASICS AND BEYOND

(Guilford Press 1995). The

cognitive model says that a person's core beliefs (often formed in childhood) contribute to 'automatic
thoughts' that pop up in every day life in response to situations. See id. at 17. Cognitive Therapy
practitioners hold that clinical depression is typically associated with negatively biased thinking and
irrational thoughts. See id. at 118.
87. For example, being a pedophile is a socially unaccepted behavior, but what about imagining
looking at child pornography? See, e.g., Amy Adler, Inverting the FirstAmendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
921, 995 (20O)
("The determination of whether a picture is child pornography has grown increasingly
bound up in our projections of whether these pictures will permit pedophiles to fantasize about them.
Thus, child pornography law has begun to police speech based on how people may respond to it. This
is in direct contravention of traditional First Amendment tenets."); see also Bruce Bower, Possible
Worlds -Imagination Gets Its Due as a Real-World Thinking Tool, SCIENCE NEWS, Mar. 26, 2005, at
That's fundamental to how people think.").
202 ("Imagination is about considering possibilities ....
88. A psychological theory of human behavior known as "cognitive dissonance" suggests that
conflicts between behavior and beliefs create a sense of discomfort which the individual
subconsciously attempts to eliminate by modifying his or her beliefs. For example, a man who believes
in nonviolence may strike someone in anger. The theory states that the man will either modify his
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thoughts and behaviors which are otherwise inappropriate or
undesirable. 89
This process of exploration and creative imagination is stymied by
the knowledge that, at some point, our inner existence may be brought to
light by the use of CCTs. This parallels precisely the chilling effect that is
associated with government restrictions on speech under First
Amendment analysis.' In such a situation, the logic is that government
restriction on speech (or imposition of penalties on speakers for
unfavorable speech) creates a disincentive toward full and robust
expression of ideas;9' if speakers are aware that their expressions will be
officially scrutinized and that they may be subsequently penalized
therefore, rational actors tend not to speak out of fear of the
consequences. 9 The chilling effect manifests because actors will selfcensor, and the overall amount of expressive exchange will diminish,
even before the restrictable or offensive speech takes place.
So too with cognition-in fact, speech may be considered little more
than the outward expression of our inner mental processes.93 Indeed,
beliefs about nonviolence to justify the violent behavior or will believe his action to be something
other than violence. He may convince himself that he was acting out of instinct or self-protection
rather than a desire to inflict harm, or that the provocation was so extreme that even a nonviolent
person like himself would have no choice but to respond. Individuals often seek reassurance from
external sources that their behavior is not in conflict with their beliefs. Nazi war criminals defended
their actions to themselves and others by claiming they were "only following orders" and were not
responsible for behavior that was in conflict with social mores. EDDIE HARMON-JONES & JUDSON MILLS,
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1999).
89. HARMON-JONES & MILLS, supra note 88.

90. Inhibition of-as well as prohibition against-the exercise of precious First Amendment
rights is a power denied to government. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
91. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543 (945) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("This liberty was not
protected because the forefathers expected its use would always be agreeable to those in authority or
that its exercise always would be wise, temperate, or useful to society. As I read their intentions, this
liberty was protected because they knew of no other way by which free men could conduct
representative democracy."); see also President Woodrow Wilson, Address at the Institute of France,
Paris (May Io,I919), in 2 SELECTED LITERARY AND POLITICAL PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF WOODROW
WILSON 333 (1926) ("I have always been among those who believed that the greatest freedom of
speech was the greatest safety, because if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to
advertise the fact by speaking. It cannot be so easily discovered if you allow him to remain silent and
look wise, but if you let him speak, the secret is out and the world knows that he is a fool. So it is by
the exposure of folly that it is defeated; not by the seclusion of folly, and in this free air of free speech
men get into that sort of communication with one another which constitutes the basis of all common
achievement.").
92. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301 (1964) ("The American Colonists were not
willing, nor should we be, to take the risk that '[m]en who injure and oppress the people under their
administration [and] provoke them to cry out and complain' will also be empowered to 'make that
very complaint the foundation for new oppressions and prosecutions."' (citation omitted)).
93. Professor Tribe, among others, has discussed how freedom of thought is an essential
ingredient in the freedom of expression. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-7,
at 9o6 (2d ed. 1988) ("The guarantee of free expression is inextricably linked to the protection and
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cognition is prefatory to speech, so we may routinely expect restrictions
on freedom of thought to translate directly or indirectly into restrictions
on speech.' CCTs will take that chilling effect one step further. Instead
of merely fearing the consequences of expressing one's ideas, utilization
of these technologies will produce a fear of the consequences of having
the ideas in the first place.
This is particularly problematic if one appreciates that our thought
processes are often not self-directed.95 Instead, the "mind wanders" and
takes us to places, or to novel notions, that we cannot see coming in
advance. 96 Much of our most important, creative, or personally significant
revelations come not because we intentionally produce them, but
because the brain has a trajectory of its own, and we are along for the
ride.
CCTs also have the capacity to reveal information about us which
will interfere with our opportunity to participate freely in the routine
aspects of daily social life. Aside from the pure chilling effect that the
development of CCTs will have on our individual and collective mental
exploration, CCTs make it possible to differentiate among individuals
based on the subjective acceptability of their ideas. For example, in the
modern era many employers, educational institutions, and public

preservation of open and unfettered mental activity."); see also ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF
THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 142 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1985) ("We

believe in the dignity, indeed the sacredness, of the individual. Anything that would violate our right
to think for ourselves, judge for ourselves, make our own decisions, live our lives as we see fit, is not
only morally wrong, it is sacrilegious."); THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
21-22 (1970) ("Forming or holding a belief occurs prior to expression. But it is the first stage in the
processes of expression, and it tends to progress into expression. Hence, safeguarding the right to form
and hold beliefs is essential in maintaining a system of freedom of expression."); JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY i8 (Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) (1859) (describing "the liberty of
thought, from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing").
94. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) ("First Amendment freedoms are
most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that
impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from
the government because speech is the beginning of thought."); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618
(1942) ("Freedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless
to control the inward workings of the mind.").
95. See, e.g., DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 27 (Bradford Books 2002)
("Each of our actions is really the culmination of an intricate set of physical and mental processes,
including psychological mechanisms that correspond to the traditional concepts of will, in that they
involve linkages between our thoughts and our actions."). See generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, WHITE
BEARS AND OTHER UNWANTED THOUGHTS: SUPPRESSION, OBSESSION, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL

CONTROL (Guilford Press 1994) (1989).
96. "The constant metamorphosis of consciousness turns out to be a natural product of the
mechanism that allows consciousness to control itself. In other words, mindwandering, is a conscious
manifestation of contrary unconscious processes created when we attempt to control the direction of
consciousness." Daniel M. Wegner, Why the Mind Wanders, in SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO
CONSCIOUSNESS 295, 295-96 (J.D. Cohen & J.W. Schooler eds., 1997), available at

http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/%7Ewegner/pdfs/Wegner %2oMind%2oWander.pdf.
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accommodations observe anti-discrimination policies.' These policies
often (rightly) prohibit differential treatment based on race, religion,
sexual orientation, disability or nationality, and the expression of bias on
these grounds 8 CCTs actually make it possible to determine, before the
actual expression of animus, whether an individual mind harbors such
bias and therefore will allow such institutions to avoid associating with
individuals who possess indicia of such animus in their brain scans.'
The problem here is that, much like the chilling effect produced by
the government's regulation of speech, the use of CCTs to identify those
"undesirables" who demonstrate brain activity consistent with bias has
the capacity to exclude those individuals from the social context well
before they behave in an inappropriate way and before the harm to be
avoided is ripe. This will produce a deeper type of chilling effect on
society. Instead of reducing the amount of expression that takes place in
society, and thus reducing the quality of the "marketplace of ideas,"
CCTs will reduce the number of individuals deemed "acceptable" for
participation in our social institutions and thus reduce the number of
"merchants" who participate in the market ex ante.
Notwithstanding these effects, CCTs may do as much harm in the
abstract as they will do in practical application. In addition to producing
individual self-censorship and creating the opportunity for social
exclusion, the existence and utilization of CCTs is a powerful rhetorical
statement about the relationship of our individual lives to the larger
collective life of the community of which we are a part. CCTs articulate a
philosophy of authoritarianism, or even totalitarianism if the government
is the operator of CCTs, which diminishes each person's sense and
exercise of agency with respect to their personal affairs. If we are not free
97. Taking examples close to home, businesses like Google, municipalities like the City of Seattle,
Washington, and universities such as my own Seattle University all have anti-discrimination policies.
See GOOGLE CODE OF CONDUCT, available at http://investor.google.com/conduct.html#2 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2007); SEATTLE MUN. CODE, tit. 14, ch. 14.04 (Dec. 2006); SEATrLE UNIVERSITY,
POLICY, available at http://www.seattleu.edu/home/aboutseattle-university/
policies/statementon diversity (last visited Nov. 22, 2007).
98. For example, the City of Seattle's comprehensive anti-discrimination code states that the
policy of the City, in the exercise of its police powers for the protection of the public health, safety,
and general welfare, and for the maintenance of peace and good government, is to assure equal
opportunity to all persons, free from restrictions because of race, color, sex, marital status, sexual
orientation, gender identity, political ideology, age, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, or the
presence of any sensory, mental or physical disability. Furthermore, gender identity means a person's
identity, expression, or physical characteristics, whether or not traditionally associated with one's
biological sex or one's sex at birth, and includes transsexual, transvestite, and transgendered persons
within the scope of its protections. SEATTLE MUN. CODE, tit. 14, ch. 14.04, subchapter 14.04.020.
NONDISCRIMINATION

99. Critics argue that this application could have a potent impact on company recruitment
decisions. For example, private firms employing CCT technology may come to offer "deception
detection" to banks looking for honest employees, to schools looking to weed out potential child
molesters, or to security companies seeking to identify those that might have a propensity for
corruption. See Wolpe et al., supra note 41, at 45-46.
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to think what we will, or if we are nQt free to observe the thought
processes that take place within us, we are simply not agents free to
construct our own realities or to creatively engage our individual world
view. If our cognitive processes are shackled by a fear that our
unorthodox ideas will be discovered, we are not free to create our own
subjective existence.
Unfortunately, a robust sense of agency (or hyperagency as one
neurobiologist has described it)'" is exactly what our brains are designed
to offer us.'' When actors in positions of power have the capacity to
intrude upon our cognitive autonomy and interfere with our perceived
ability to self-regulate, self-actualize, and self-direct, they undermine the
primary evolutionary value of our expansive cerebral capacities. Agency,
or a sense of the self that possesses the capacity to act, is necessary to
socialization.' 2 We cannot conceive of our relationship to others if we
cannot develop a full sense of our self."° Much like a mathematical
relationship, we cannot derive our relational equation without knowing
the value of all the variables. Such anti-social outcomes should be
internalized to the calculated cost of using CCTs if the full impact of their
use is to be appreciated.
II. EMANCIPATE YOURSELF FROM MENTAL SLAVERY" 4
The purpose of Part II of this Article is to situate CCTs, both as they
now exist and as representative of the larger trend in informationgathering institutions toward probing mental content, within the larger
social discourse around the role and importance of the mind in creating

100. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN 54 (Dana Press 2005).
los. See id. This concept enables us to feel that we have a distinct choice about how we live our
lives. It is the unique ability to make choices and enjoy a sense of autonomy and freedom that makes
us uniquely human and not "predestined robots" on a spiral path toward our own destruction. id.
102. Researchers have studied how different cultures have valued the construction of the
individual, or "self," finding that in collective cultures individuals may be induced to subordinate their
personal goals to the goals of some of the collective, while in individualistic cultures, individuals end
relationships and form new ones rather than subordinate their personal goals. Imbedded in these
findings is the concept of social comparison in which one's ability to identify with others in relationship
to their concept of "self" is what forms the basis of their social identity. See KENNETH J. GERGEN, AN

INVITATION to SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION (SAGE Publications 1999) (evaluating the effect of increased

social stimulation on the concept of self); Harry C. Triandis et al., Individualism and Collectivism:
Cross-CulturalPerspectives on Self-Ingroup Relationships, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 323 (1988)
(analyzing the different notions of self as they are reflected in both subjective and collective societies);
see also ALAN FOGEL, DEVELOPING THROUGH RELATIONSHIPS: ORIGINS OF COMMUNICATION, SELF, and
CULTURE 139-53 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1993).
103. See generally KENNETH JAY GERGEN, THE SATURATED SELF: DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY IN
CONTEMPORARY LIFE (Basic Books 1991) (discussing the history and major issues in social
constructivism).
104. BOB MARLEY, Redemption Song, on UPRISING (Island Records i98o) ("Emancipate yourselves
from mental slavery, none but ourselves can free our minds.").
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various individual identity vectors. 5 The thesis behind this discussion is
that CCTs may have the capacity to interfere with the creation and
maintenance of subjective social realities, and may interfere with both
individual and collective definitions of the "self." Three different aspects
of identity construction are offered as illustrative of how CCTs can
intrude upon these important social-situating processes, with the express
understanding that this is a representative and not exhaustive listing of
the wider array of cognition-based functions that may be impeded by
intrusive CCTs.' 6
A.

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND THE SOLITUDE OF THE MIND

Perhaps the simplest place to start this discussion is with an
individual's sense of her own identity as being distinct from the identity
of other members of the community. This construction of the self allows
us to distinguish the subject "I" from the collective "we" and the discreet
"they," and relies centrally on separateness and apartness for its
structural significance." At the core of the ego concept of "I" is a unitary
and solitary conception of the self as the fully individualized, indivisible,
lowest common denominator of social organizations; ' in essence,
individuals with discreet core identities are the basic building blocks of
any larger and more sophisticated social unit. This concept of
personhood is grounded in the notion that there is an inner existence
which is unique and available only to that individual,'" and upon the
attendant consequence that no other social being can inject their
presence into another's inner existence without the individual's
consent."'
It has long been conjectured that individual subjective thought is the
basis for our sense of self,"' and is the medium by which we create and
then navigate our perceptual reality."' The most famous expression of
this now well established premise was penned by Ren6 Descartes in his
105. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support

Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 270 (2002) (listing "sexuality, class, physical
ability, age[, and] religion" as among the many "vectors" of individual and group identification); Leti
Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, Iol Colum. L. Rev. 1181, 1202 (2001) (discussing the
"mutually constitutive" operation of race and gender as vectors of identity).
lo6. These three modes for discussing social identity are among the many to which the collection
of cognitive evidence is germane. This section is thus little more than a sampling of the kind of
considerations CCTs may raise, and it is not meant to delve into any one of these three areas any
deeper than is necessary to demonstrate the connection between cognitive freedom and the creation of
an autonomous sense of self.
107. MORRIS ROSENBERG, CONCEIVING THE SELF 5-51 (Basic Books 1986).

Io8. Id.
1O9.

Id.

Ito. Id.
IIi. Id.
112.

Id.
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Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, when he
sought to discard all knowledge that could be questioned and ended with
the irreducible truth: "I think, therefore I am...... To unpack that slightly,
Descartes is expressing his conclusion that it is the process of cognition
that creates the world in which we subjectively live; that it is the process
of cognition, our ability to question our existence initially, that proves we
are real. It is the mind's ability to think that allows the formation of the
self that can then express the ego concept of "I." 4
Western philosophy is built upon the footing of Descartes' initial

realization that thinking is the crucial process that marks our subjective
existence,"' and upon his theory of dualism, which holds mind and body
to be wholly distinct aspects of the self."6 By placing thought at the
center of an individual's identity construction mechanisms, postCartesian philosophy emphasizes the role of the mind in explaining our
experienced social realities and in acquiring and processing knowledge." 78
Whether attributed to the physical layout of human cerebral structures,'

or rather to information processing responses to cultural influences,"'
our cognitive content, patterns and behaviors remain central factors

113. REN9 DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 21-6

(David Weissman ed., Yale Univ. Press 1996).
114. Chin-Tai Kim, Cartesian Dualism and the Unity of Mind, 80 MIND 337, 346-52. (1971); R.A.
Wilson, Some Problemsfor "Alternative Individualism," 67 PHIL. Scl. 671,674-76 (2ooO).
115. THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO DESCARTES 140-41 (John Cottingham ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1992).
116. Id. at 236. See generally Frank B. Dilley, Taking Consciousness Seriously: A Defense of
CartesianDualism, 55 INT'L J. FOR PHIL. RELIGION 135 (2004).
117. ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD 142 (Heinemann Educ. Books
1972); John W. Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid, 94 MIND 300, 300-02 (1985);
David Hartman & Diane Zimberoff, Trauma, Transitions, and Thriving, 8 J. HEART-CENTERED
THERAPIES 3, 71-72 (2005); Woodrow W. Clark Jr. & Michael Fast, A New Foundation for MicroEconomic Theory -Interactionism 8-13 (Int'l Bus. Econs. Ctr. for Int'l Studies, Working Paper No. 35,
20o0), available at http://www.business.aau.dk/ivo/publications/working/wp35.pdf;
Philip Lewin, The
Problem of Objectivity in Post-CriticalPhilosophy, 18 POLANYI SOC'Y PERIODICAL I8, 21 (1991-1992),
available at http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyiITAD/2oWEB /2oARCHIVE
/fADI8ifTADi8-i-fnl-full-pdf.pdf. See generally JAMES L. MARSH, POST-CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN ESSAY
IN DIALECTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY (Fordham Univ. Press 1988).
I i8. Roberto Cabeza & Lars Nyberg, Imaging CognitionII: An EmpiricalReview of275 PET and
fMRI Studies, 12 J. COGNrnVE NEUROSCIENCE I (2ooo); Richard Lane et al., Neural Correlates of Levels
of Emotional Awareness: Evidence of an Interaction Between Emotion and Attention in the Anterior
Cingulate Cortex, 1O J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 525 (1988); David Rock & Jeffrey Schwartz, The
Neuroscience of
Leadership, STRATEGY
+
Bus.,
Summer
2oo6,
http://www.strategybusiness.com/press/freearticle/o6207.
ii9. See, e.g., Evelyn Gonztilez-Figueroa & Deborah Koniak-Griffin, Understanding Cultural
Influence on Health Behaviors of Latino Adolescent Parents,LATINO POL'Y & ISSUES BRIEF, Feb. 2006,
at 1-3, available at http://www.ph.ucla.edu/cehd!Documents/LPIB-12Feb2oo6.pdf; Stephan Dahl,
Communications and Culture Transformation 8-21 (unpublished project presented to the European
University, Barcelona, available at http://stephweb.com/capstone/capstone.pdf (last visited Nov. 22.
2007)).
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philosophers use to describe the nature of the self.'2"
Psychological approaches to defining the self parallel the
philosophical focus on cognition as the process of, or at least central to
the process of, identity construction.' Answering the question "who am
I?" from a psychological perspective requires a model of the mental
states that provide an awareness of the subject in relation to the external
world.'22 According to certain structural approaches, the self is simply a
theory of identity constructed by the individual as she weaves her
experiential life history into a unified, whole concept of her being.' 3
Competing theories of social psychology suggest that individual identity
is really a collection of multiple "selves" acquired during and influenced
by the course of interpersonal interaction.' 4 The shared perspective in
any psychological study of the self is one that focuses on the mind and
the locus of the narrative tale we tell ourselves in order to know who and
what we are.
Neurobiological influences on psychological understandings further
the parallel. While psychologists have gone a long way toward charting
the "self-talk" or internal narrative that articulates our thoughts and
represents our character,' 5 neurobiologists have supplemented our
knowledge by correlating observable cognitive strategies to underlying
brain behaviors.2' In addition to mapping the location of cerebral

120.

Linda Martin Alcoff, Habitsof Hostility on Seeing Race, 44 PHIL. TODAY 30,34-35 (2000); Kim

Chong, Zhuangzi and the Nature of Metaphor, 56 PHIL. E. & W. 370, 381-83 (2006); James S. Hans,
Alexander Nehamas and the Art of Living, 44 PHIL. TODAY 190, 196-201 (20OO). See generally Deborah
Cook, Nature Becoming Conscious of Itself: Adorno on Self-Reflection, 50 PHIL. TODAY 296 (2006).
121. See generally ROM HARRt, THE SINGULAR SELF: AN INTRODUCTION to the PSYCHOLOGY OF
PERSONHOOD

(1998).

Maggie MacLure, Arguing for Your Self: Identity as an OrganisingPrinciplein Teachers' Jobs
and Lives, I9 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 311, 314-19 (1993); Scott Webster, PersonalIdentity: Moving Beyond
Essence, 10 INT'L J. CHILDREN'S SPIRITUALITY 5, 5-16 (2005).
123. See LASzL6 TENGELYI, THE WILD REGION IN LIFE-HISTORY (G. Kallay trans., Northwestern
Univ. Press 2004).
124. See HOWARD GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: THE THEORY IN PRACTICE 8- 9 (Basic Books
1993) (discussing evidence for the existence of semi-independent intelligences, such as logicalmathematical, linguistic, spatial, musical, etc. which are located in specific areas of the human brain);
Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Split Brain Revisited, ScI. Am., July 1998, at 50-55 (reviewing studies on
patients whose separated cerebral hemispheres act as two semi-independent selves); Brent W. Roberts
& Eileen M. Donahue, One Personality,Multiple Selves: IntegratingPersonalityand Social Roles, 62 J.
PERSONALITY 199, 200-02 (1994).
125.
See Maggie MacLure, Mundane Autobiography: Some Thoughts on Self-Talk in Research
Contexts, 14 BRIT. J. Soc. EDUC. 334, 337 (1993) ("[T]o understand ourselves we must examine how
currently we account for ourselves in everyday self-talk, the procedures and practices we routinely use
in making sense of our activities to one another [... 1 our concepts of ourselves are revealed to us in
how we talk about ourselves in all the different ways that we do.") (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
126. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. II, 2007, at 49, 50
122.

("This is the new frontier in law and science-we're peering into the black box to see how the brain is
actually working, that hidden place in the dark quiet, where we have our private thoughts and private
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responses to various types of stimuli-cerebral responses that manifest
our cognitive processing - neurobiologists are also successfully
associating certain pathological personality disorders with organic and
traumatic brain damage. 2 7 Without dwelling on the excessively technical,
neurobiology is building upon the advances of psychology by linking the
flawed construction of the subjective self to clinically observable flaws in
the cognitive processing equipment.
Central to every one of these various approaches to studying the
brain, the mind, and personality is the connection between thinking and
being. It is our ability to think, and the character of our thoughts, that
gives us a sense of who we are and the perceived autonomy of selfdefinition. In fact, these two concepts are reflexively linked, for one
belief we are conditioned to hold is that autonomous self-definition is an
aspect of identity as well as a process by which identity is created.' 2s
Intrusion upon that thought process, therefore, necessarily impacts the
products of the cognitive processing in two ways.
First, a well developed sense of self is based on the perceived
impenetrability of our cognitive environment-I can think of my "self"
as that unique aggregation of thoughts to which no one else is privy.
Enforcing second party privity, by intruding upon the solitude of
individual thought processing, detracts from that formulation of the
sense of self which depends on exclusion for its meaning.
Second, CCTs and other efforts to peer into cognitive processes and
thought patterns do in fact divest the individual of some control over the
identity she can create. Exposure of the individual's thought processes
destroys the intimacy of her self-talk so that it cannot play the same role
in identity construction as can the uninterrupted internal monologue.
More blatantly, forcible interjection of information, thoughts, and ideas
through CCTs and other CLIs forces the individual to internalize those
messages such that the individual's identity is no longer a reflection
solely of the processes naturally occurring within her. Being alone with
one's thoughts, and preserving the retreat of the individual mind, is thus
a central feature of our functioning as rational, self-aware beings.

reactions-and the law will inevitably have to decide how to deal with this new technology." (quoting
Professor Owen Jones)).
127. See, e.g., Robert van Reekum et al., Can TraumaticBrain Injury Cause Psychiatric Disorders?
12 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 316, 317 (20O) (discussing the long-accepted
association between traumatic brain injury and changes in mood, personality, and behavior, as well as
the correlation between brain injury and other psychiatric disorders including major depression,
bipolar affective disorder, general-anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, and
posttraumatic stress disorder).
128. Personal and Social Identity, http://science.jrank.orglpages/9745/Personal-Social-IdentityCommitment-Culture-Relation-between-Personal-Social-Identity.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2007).
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COGNITION AND THE DIVINE

Individual thought processes, and the ability to think freely, are also
central to our basic understanding of metaphysical and spiritual
existence. To take one example, meditation or prayer, as a form of divine
communion, is a feature of almost every organized spiritual tradition. 2 9
Both meditation and prayer entail a channeling or concentration of
thought upon the divine object, and are held to allow communication
between the spiritual aspect of our persona, often called our soul, and the
supernatural or creative forces of the universe that may be worshipped in
various forms.'30 In very simplified terms, meditation and prayer are little
more than a process of engaging in directed thinking while especially
attuned to the will of the divine audience.'3' Some religious traditions
conceive of their deity as existing separate and apart from the world,
observant of but not present in the material plane we inhabit.'32 Other
religious traditions understand their deity as imbuing all material
existence and as residing, in undiminished part, in each person.'33
Whether the narrative is directed across that perceived distance, or
directed to the divine presence within each person, the key to our ability
to subjectively communicate with the greater god-like forces in which we
believe is our ability to think we are doing so.' sg Descartes might have put
it thus: we think we know God, therefore we know God.
Free and unfettered thought is also central to one other dynamic
underlying many of the world's religions-the divinely-inspired vision.
From Moses' receipt of the Ten Commandments,'35 to Joseph Smith's
dream that bore the Mormon Church, 1, 6 to Siddhartha Gautama's
realization under the banyan tree,'37 religious mythology makes regular
129. See Marianne Szegedy-Maszak & Caroline Hsu, How We Talk to God, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 20, 2004, at 55. See generally DENIS LARDNER CARMODY & JOHN TULLY CARMODY, PRAYER IN
WORLD RELIGIONS (Orbis Books 199o); HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS (Harper Collins
199').
130. See Eleonore Stump, PetitionaryPrayer,in PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A READER AND GUIDE
609, 609-24 (William Lane Craig ed., 2002).
131. See Felicity Brock Kelcourse, Prayer and the Soul: Dialogues That Heal, 40 J. RELIGION &
HEALTH, 231, 231-32 (2001).

132. On deism, see NORMAN L. GEISLER, CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS 151-73 (Baker Academics 2004)
(1988), and Michael A. Harbin, Theistic Evolution: Deism Revisited?, 40 J. EVANGELICAL THEOLOGICAL
SOC'Y 639, 649 (1997).
133. On Catholicism, see NEW ADVENT CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/o6612a.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2007). On Judaism, see WAYNE DOSICK, LIVING JUDAISM: THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO JEWISH BELIEF, TRADITION, AND PRACTICE

(Harper Collins 1998).

134. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS (R. C. Zaehner ed., Beacon Press
1959) (discussing examples from Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Sikhism).
135. See Exodus 20:1-17 (King James); Deuteronomy 5:6-21 (King James).
136. See LDS.org, Joseph Smith-History s, http://scriptures.lds.org/js-h/I/3#3 (describing account
of first revelatory vision) (last visited Nov. 22, 2007); see also Joseph Smith, Jr. et al., History of the

Church, in PERSONAL

WRITINGS OF JOSEPH SMITH 9-14

(Dean C. Jessee ed., Deseret Book

2002)

(1984).

137. CARL OLSON, THE DIFFERENT PATHS OF BUDDHISM: A NARRATIVE-HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 45
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use of transcendent revelation as a way to convey divine knowledge or
communicate divine will to worldly followers. There are two crucial
components which underlie the ability of revelatory visions to achieve
these educative effects.' 35 First is the assumed validity of human
perceptive experience, whereby honest perceptual experience of an
event can be translated into or stand as proxy for its actual objective
occurrence.'39 Given that assumption, the visionaries who would be
labeled prophets need to convince followers that they in fact had the
described vision; they do not need to convince followers that, if the vision
was real, it reflects the word of God. The second component is the
unchallenged assumption that what happens in the inner perceptual
reality of the mind of one person is not available for consumption by
others.' *" That is what makes the visions so precious, because by the
nature of the mind the experience can only be had one person at a time.
With respect to both aspects of religious vision narratives, the freedom to
receive divine inspiration and instruction comes from each person's
innate right to think for and by themselves.
CCTs would intrude on the role that religion plays in personal and
communal life in myriad ways. First and perhaps foremost, CCTs could
greatly enhance the existing tension between scientific and religious
explanations for various phenomena. Already there are efforts to explain
the institution of religion as a function of neurobiology.'"' These efforts
taken several dangerous steps further could be used to argue that
religion and religious belief are nothing more than neuropathology, with
CCTs being used to chart the various wave patterns we might otherwise
associate with contact with the transcendent. The beginnings of a
neurobiological basis to explain a belief in God, expressed in terms of the
cognitive behaviors being engaged in by a specific person's brain, will go
a long way toward undermining that person's faith.'42 This is not to say
that science and religion are necessarily at odds, but it does suggest that
the developing ability to scan the brain while it works will have
significant secondary social effects that should be considered from a legal
perspective.

(Rutgers Univ. Press

2005); see also THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS, supra note 129, at 85-86.
138. Ina Praetorius, Speaking of God as a Woman Since the Enlightenment, 15 FEMINIST THEOLOGY
84, 88-90 (2006).
139. Id.
140. id.
141. See EUGENE D'AQUILI & ANDREW B. NEWBERG, THE MYSTICAL MIND 147 (Fortress Press 1999);

James B. Ashbrook & Carol Rausch Albright, The Humanizing Brain: An Introduction, ZYGON, Mar.
I999, at 7; Rebecca Sachs Norris, Examining the Structure and Role of Emotion: Contributions of

Neurobiology to the Study of Embodied Religious Experience,ZYGON, Mar. 2005, at 181.
142. See Seth Holtzman, Science and Religion: The Categorical Conflict, 54 INT'L J.

FOR PHIL.

RELIGION 77, 77 (2003); George Johnson, Science and Religion Cross Their Line in the Sand, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12,

1998, § 4, at I.
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Likewise, the use of CCTs to violate a zone of cognitive exclusion
interferes with religious existence by intruding upon the confidential
nature of the relationship we might create with our deity of choice. Nonconsensual exposure to CCTs during communication and communion
with the divine destroys the intimacy in that mortal/immortal
relationship that gives it its power as a moral and social guiding force.
Moreover, the use of CCTs to observe what the subject may believe to be
communication with the divine is descriptively incompatible with notions
of omniscience 43' and the belief that God is revealed to those who are
chosen,'" not to those with the right apparatus. Again, the use of CCTs
to invade sanctified cognitive spaces intrudes on our ability to engage
fully in the pursuit of religious or spiritual truth by interfering with our
thoughts, which are the primary mechanism of its realization.
C.

MENTAL FREEDOM AND POLITICAL AGENCY

The right to think freely, and to make uncoerced judgments about
public policy questions is essential to our democratic institutions and our
political theory of informed rational choice.' 45 The constitutional theory
of democracy presumes the existence of a body of voters who have the
capacity to make calculated decisions about matters of collective
importance.' 6 The institutions of government depend on the exchange of
ideas and the process of political debate to produce leadership direction
and the authority to govern.'47 Indeed, much of the credibility possessed
by instruments of the government comes from the perception that "We
the People," being fully informed and free to decline, accepted this
representative form of government because it best preserved the
'48
freedom of thought and belief we held to be innate in free citizens.
Constraints on conscience are antithetical to democratic government if
only because those constraints are an inefficiency that impedes the ability
of mechanisms for political exchange to identify optimal social outcomes
or policies.
Likewise, informed choice models generally rely on the freedom of
the decision maker to reach her own conclusions,'49 and invest primary
143. Michael Carasik, The Limits of Omniscience, 2 J. BIBLICAL LITERATURE 221, 221 (2000).
144. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS, supra note 134. The idea of divine
selection and the human channeling of God's will or wisdom figures prominently in the theological
narratives of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Id.
145. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L. J. t, 8-9;
Scott C. Pugh, Checkbook Journalism, Free Speech, and Fair Trials, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1739, 1752
1995); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 14-15 (1976).
146. See Ingber, supra note 145; Pugh supra note 145.
147. See lngber, supra note 145; Pugh supra note 145.
148. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifty-Seventh Cleveland-MarshallLecture: The Bill of Rights and
Our Prosperity, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 577-78 (1994). See generally MICHAEL LESSNOFF, SOCIAL
CONTRACT

(Humanities Press Int'l 1986);

JOHN RAWLS,

A

THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).

149. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[A]t the heart of the First
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importance in the quality of the information that forms the basis of the
decision. 5 In the political context, informed choice models of individual
democratic behaviors presume that correct decision making follows
rational calculation of known variables. 5' The validity of these decisionmaking moments depends on there being a genuine choice presented to
the decision maker, or else the rational calculation is short-circuited.'52
Again, constraints on conscience are inconsistent with informed choice
by political actors because such constraints interfere with the process of
evaluation that leads to correct decision making.
To connect these two political considerations to Brain
Fingerprinting and CCTs permits a review of much that has already been
said. The development of CCTs will create an environment in which
public and private actors can violate space that previously belonged to
the individual alone. In that space occurs many of the most important
constructive processes that give us a sense of who we are. To be
observed, and perhaps recorded, in the process of cognitively navigating
the outer world will distort that process irretrievably simply by virtue of
the observation.'53 No one can think as freely and as broadly when they
are being watched, either by themselves or by others. This in turn creates
an environment for the promotion and enforcement of political
orthodoxy, for knowing how and what an individual thinks on political
matters allows differentiation among people on those grounds.'54 The
fear of such ideological monitoring by use of CCTs will unavoidably
change the substance of individual subjective ideologies and, in the long
run, diminish the richness of ideological and political exchange overall.
These three arenas of cognitive inquiry, into the nature of our
subject self, about the nature of our spiritual reality, and regarding our
political beliefs and civic commitments, outline just three of the identity
vectors that, in the aggregate, define us both subjectively and objectively,
or from the perspective of the internal and external viewer. CCTs and
other CLIs threaten the effectiveness of each of these three areas of
human thought and threaten the authenticity of the results reached
Amendment is the notion that.., in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience rather than coerced by the State.").
150. See John H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCL 246 (1993); Thomas 1.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 882-84 (1963).
151. See Aldrich, supra note 15o.
152. See id.
153. One might at this point draw a useful analogy to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.
According to Heisenberg, we can never know both the exact location and exact velocity of a particle in
motion, because the energy required to view the particle will actually affect its motion. Likewise, the
nature of unfettered thought would be altered simply by its observation, without regard to any
subsequent consequence of that observation.
154. See Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (I992); Owen M. Fiss,
Why the State?, too HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretations,Comparative
Constitutionalism,and Fiss-ian Freedoms,58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265 (2OO3).
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through these inquiries. While the time for such deep interference has
yet to come, eventual interference will impair the ability of individuals to
create and maintain a social identity and thus impair the effectiveness of
our social institutions insofar as they are built around the self as the basic
unit of accumulated social communities.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT FAILINGS:
THE PROBABLE CAUSE/WARRANT COMPLEX

Justice Jackson's

1948 opinion in United States v. Johnson'55

discussed the Fourth Amendment's command that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon on probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."'' 6 In deciding whether law enforcement officers were
legally permitted to forcibly enter the Seattle hotel room of Ms. Anne
Johnson without prior judicial approval based on credible reports of
ongoing narcotics activity,'57 the Court had to determine whether the
warrant process had a role to play in regulating searches such as these.' 5
Even though the officers, based on their training and experience,
unquestionably had probable cause to believe that crime was afoot,
Justice Jackson invalidated the officer's behavior precisely because no
warrant had issued.'59 The suppression of evidence was necessary to
communicate that
[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 6"
With this decision, Justice Jackson gave concrete form to a
previously amorphous "warrant preference,"' 6' and established a
standard under which all warrantless intrusions (that is, either a "search"
or "seizure" as those terms of art are defined) are presumptively illegal.
155. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
i56. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
157. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12.
158. Id. at 13-14.
159. Id. at 16-17.
i6o. Id. at 13-14.

t61. See Silverthorne Lumber v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914).
162. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14; accord Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981);

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (197I) (invalidating law enforcement search for
failure to secure a warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (t967); see also Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113, 116 (1998) (discussing the "warrant preference" in the context of doctrinal exceptions to
application of the preference); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,379 (1993); Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321, 326 (1987); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,394 (1985).
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According to Justice Jackson, any intrusion upon Fourth
Amendment interests must be, at least in the ordinary case, based on the
informed judgment of a judicial officer and not on the whims or
determinations of law enforcement officers.' 63 To assume "that evidence
sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant
would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and 64leave the people's homes
secure only in the discretion of police officers."'

Thus, under the warrant preference approach, officers seeking to
engage in Fourth Amendment searches or seizures must be able to
demonstrate to a magistrate, in advance, evidence that would lead a
person of reasonable caution to conclude that evidence of crime, or
contraband items, will be discovered in the place (or on the person) to be
searched.' 6' This is one approach a court might take in deciding whether
to allow the use of CCTs in an individual circumstance.
Not surprisingly, given the nature of the test, the warrant preference
will do little to prevent the utilization of Brain Fingerprinting or other
CCTs if officers can demonstrate that admissible evidence will be
discovered as a result. In fact, there is nothing about the warrant
preference test that would be especially responsive to CCTs. Instead, the
use of CCTs would be treated like any other search, and the only
impediment to the invasion of the mind of a suspect is the government's
ability to demonstrate a "fair probability" '66 that legitimate evidentiary
targets will be hit. To make matters worse, according to a recent D.C.
Circuit decision, there is nothing to prevent the same argument from
being used to secure judicial approval to invade the mind of a nonsuspect, so long as the evidence officers possess is relevant to a
prosecutable offense and the investigating agent can demonstrate a
likelihood of its discovery.'
163. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
164- Id.
165. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1924). The Court in Carroll suggested that
probable cause exists if "the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that [the crime was being committed]." Id. "The point of the Fourth Amendment,
which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14. "[T]he
Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed
between the citizen and the police'. .. and that searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz, 389
U.S. at 357 (footnotes and citations omitted).
I66. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
167. See Johnson v. Quander, 44o F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 103 (2006).
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One method employed by courts to avoid the absolutist position of
the warrant preference approach, and to circumvent the associated
presumption of inadmissibility applied to warrantless intrusions, is to
construe a particular investigative technique as falling outside the
category of conduct amounting to a search or seizure. '68 This
determination relieves the intruding agent of the responsibility of being
constitutionally justified in her conduct, and the consequences of the
determination have led courts to define the terms narrowly in order to
minimize the impact of the exclusionary rule.'69
This decision-making technique is particularly common where
evidence is collected by use of a technological sense-enhancer that allows
remote surveillance. 7 ' Again, even before the constitutional
reasonableness can be assessed, a court must decide whether the
government's use of the sense-enhancing technology leads to the type of
privacy invasion against which the Fourth Amendment protects."' In the
paradigmatic case, officers occupying lawful locations employ mechanical
or technological advantage to gather facts not otherwise perceivable. For

168. While it is true that the absence of physical penetration of a location was at one time thought
to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928),
the Court has since departed from such a narrow view now holding that what a person seeks to keep
private, even in public, may be constitutionally protected. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Hence,
an implied analysis evolved to which the court must first determine if there was in fact a "search" or
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and only then proceed to ask if it was constitutional or
"reasonable." See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 38 (1988) (holding that there was no
search when the police examined garbage bags left on the curb); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
749 (i97i) (holding that "however strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his
expectations in this respect are not protected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the
colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities").
j69. See White, 401 U.S. at 753 (declaring that undercover surveillance employing remote
electronic surveillance does not implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus is not a search
within the meaning of the amendment, in part because of the consequential suppression of evidence
that is likely to result: "[W]e [should not] be too ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and
probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable").
170. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that aerial
photographs taken using a "mapping camera" of petitioner's plant complex from an aircraft lawfully in
public navigable airspace was not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding "[tihat the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all
police observation" within public navigable airspace); United States v. Knotts, 46o U.S. 276, 282 (1983)
("Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
case.").
171. However, in United States v. White, the Court stated:
Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular
situations may be or the extent to which they may in fact have relied on the discretion of
their companions.... Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what
expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable'-what expectations the Fourth
Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant.
401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971).
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example, in Florida v. Riley, law enforcement officers used low altitude
fly-overs to detect marijuana growing operations within the otherwise
protected curtilage of a suspect's home.'72 After executing a search of the
property and seizing the plants, officers offered them into evidence in
Riley's prosecution. '
The defendant challenged admission of this evidence as being the
product of a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 74
In upholding the warrantless use of the aircraft for visual inspection, the
Supreme Court emphasized that Riley had not taken adequate
precautions to protect his backyard from aerial surveillance.'75 Even
though his garden was not visible from the ground, 76 and though it would
have required a physical trespass by the officers to be discovered, " the
fact that the officers could see the plants while lawfully occupying public
airspace was determinative.""s So long as he left his activities open for
observation to anyone who decided to fly over his property, and so long
as the officers were in lawful overflight, Riley would be construed to
have knowingly exposed his activities and surrendered any expectation
of privacy he may have once had.'79
The Court had already determined that aerial surveillance from a
fixed-wing aircraft flying in legally navigable airspace is not equivalent to
a search and therefore need not be conducted pursuant to a judicial
warrant."" In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,' ' Dow challenged the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) warrantless use of an aerial
camera to take surveillance photos during a fly-over of Dow's facility as
part of an EPA enforcement action. 28 The facility was photographed
from altitudes as low as 1,200 feet, and the camera used was a high
resolution type normally used for making detailed maps.' 83 In spite of
Dow's "elaborate security around the perimeter of the complex barring

172. 488 U.S. 445,448, 450 (1989).
173. Id. at 448-49.
174. Id. at 449.

175. Id. at 450 ("Because the sides and roof of [Riley's] greenhouse were left partially open,
however, what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air [and thus] Riley
could not reasonably have expected the contents of his greenhouse to be immune from
examination.").
176. Id. at 448.
177. See id. Physical trespass would have been required to discover the contents of the garden
because the investigating officer could not see the contents of the greenhouse from the road. Id.
178. Id. at 450.
179. Id. at 450-51.
i8o. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that naked-eye aerial observation
from an altitude of one thousand feet of a backyard within the curtilage of a home does not constitute
a search under the Fourth Amendment).
181. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
182. Id. at 229-30.
183. Id. at 229.
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ground-level public views,"' 84 the company's failure to obscure the plant
from overhead surveillance deprived it of constitutional protection.5
Because "any person with an airplane and an aerial camera could readil!
duplicate" the photos, their collection did not constitute a search.'
Implied in this decision is an assumption that some private parties do in
fact have access to both airplanes and high resolution aerial mapping
cameras.
Building on these aerial surveillance cases, the Court's 2001 decision
in Kyllo v. United States'sT articulates with greater clarity the principles on
which previous technology or remote surveillance decisions appear to be
based. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia determined that the Fourth
Amendment is not offended if law enforcement officers collect evidence
of criminal activity by use of technology that is available to the general
18
public, even if that observation is made without prior judicial approval.'
The reasoning behind this conclusion is that the Fourth Amendment,
when called on to respond to search techniques that did not exist at the
time of the framing of the Amendment, should nevertheless be
interpreted to provide that level of protection from official invasion
which the founders would have enjoyed.'"" In implementing this
operational inquiry, a court must inquire whether the challenged search
is sufficiently like the searches which motivated the drafting of the
Fourth Amendment to merit equivalent treatment.' 9° Most importantly,
for purposes of determining which technological advantages the
government may permissibly employ, the Court emphasized that we can
only expect that level of protection from the government's gaze as we
can expect from our neighbors'.' 9'
184. Id.

185. Id. at 230 ("Dow indeed had a subjective expectation of privacy in certain areas from groundlevel intrusions, but the court was not persuaded that Dow had a subjective expectation of being free
from aerial surveillance since Dow had taken no precautions against such observations, in contrast to
its elaborate ground level precautions."); see also id. at 237 n.4 ("'If elaborate and expensive measures
for ground security show that Dow has an actual expectation of privacy in ground security, as Dow
argues, then taking no measure for aerial security should say something about its actual privacy
expectation in being free from aerial observation."' (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749
F.2d 307,312 (6th Cir. 1984))).
186. Id. at 231.
187. 533 U.S. 27 (2OOl).

188. See id. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use,
to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.").
189. Id. at34.
19o. Id. at 40 ("'The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light which was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public
interest as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."' (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 149 (1925))).
191. See id. at 35 n.2. (rejecting the dissent's comparison of the thermal imaging to various
circumstances in which outside observers might be able to perceive, without technology, the heat of
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This means, according to Kyllo's technology-centered approach, that
we have no expectation of privacy in expression or behavior that could
be observed or recorded using devices that are generally available."' The
airplane and the binoculars at issue in Floridav. Riley fit this description.
The long-range camera used in Dow Chemical, even though somewhat
specialized for commercial photography, fit this description. Presumably,
the wireless scanning device you can buy from a local electronics store
means that the cordless telephone conversations it can monitor are no
longer entitled to an expectation that the uninvited ear will be excluded.
It also meant that, in the actual case, Mr. Kyllo possessed an expectation
of privacy in the waste heat that emanated from his home because
thermal imaging devices were not at that time available to or used by
members of his community.'93
The pivotal question, according to Kyllo, in deciding what sort of
warrantless, technology-enhanced evidence collecting techniques will be
permissible under the Fourth Amendment is the extent to which the
public can or does make use of the same devices.' 4 Applying this to
Brain Fingerprinting and current CCTs, there is no question that
warrantless use of these devices to collect brain scans is not now in the
offing. The size and price of the MRI and EEG machines necessary to
collect such data are prohibitive of public access. However, only a short
memory is required to recall the time when cell phones, and even
personal computers, were likewise room-sized machines unavailable to
the public, and there is no reason to assume that CCT technology will not
also decrease in both size and expense. This is particularly true if the law
operates in such a way as to create and enhance the commercial market
for such technologies.'95 In the yet-far-off age when CCT is accessible to
the home-for example, by observing snowmelt on the roof, the majority stated: "The fact that
equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of
means that violate the Fourth Amendment").
192. Id. at 34 ("We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use." (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (i96i))).
193. Id. at 40.
194. The Court has sent ambiguous signals as to which type of public use, actual or simply

potential, matters most for these purposes. In fact, in Florida v. Riley, this question fractured what
would otherwise have been a majority opinion. 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgement).
195. This market participatory feature of constitutionally-based law enforcement regulation has
been demonstrated with myriad other technologies, ranging from non-lethal weaponry to pilot-less
drone aircraft to camera-equipped robotics. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTCE, GUIDE TO THE
TECHNOLOGIES OF CONCEALED WEAPON AND CONTRABAND IMAGING AND DETECTION (2001), available at
http:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/i84432.pdf;

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

NONLETHAL WEAPONS

A RESEARCH GUIDE FOR CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
availableat http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/2o5293.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
EQUIPMENT REVIEw:
EQUIPMENT

SELECTION

AND

APPLICATION

GUIDE

(I999),
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the civilian community, Kyllo's approach to regulating the use of
technology against the public without judicial approval will provide no
obstacle to the official invasion of our mental spaces.
This is precisely the problem, or at least a problem, with Kyllo's
emphasis on the availability of the challenged technology and its
minimization of the nature of the intrusion in the Fourth Amendment
analysis. It converts what should be a normative inquiry into the proper
relationship between individual freedom and government authority into
a descriptive exercise in which the Court is allowed to take "judicial
notice" of, if not actually define by reference to unstated assumptions,
the prevalence of public use of a particular device. This is not to suggest
that the legitimate boundaries of our right to an autonomous personal
existence cannot be informed by reference to public rather than
governmental behaviors and interests, for these matters should be a part
of the assessment. But the way in which Kyllo forces us to think about
the role of our neighbors in interpreting the Fourth Amendment leaves
this constitutional provision with no firm or absolute meaning. According
to such an interpretation, there is no floor beneath which private
protection from government intrusion cannot sink.
There are, of course, theoretical and practical limitations
constraining the scientific development of new means of technological
intrusion, but to rely on these constraints as the bulwark against erosion
of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment inverts the proper
relationship between a constitution and the society it organizes. Instead
of deriving its meaning solely by reference to what private citizens may
do to invade each other's rightful zone of exclusion, a principled
interpretation of the Amendment would begin by asking what basic
behaviors are inconsistent or incompatible with the standards around
which our society is organized. Essentially, Kyllo allows law enforcement
regulation to turn on the inherently shifting sands of private behavior,
since there need be no normative justification for the private uses of
technology that then provide permission for official exploitation of the
same technique. Absent from Kyllo's test is any inquiry into the moral or
ethical acceptability of using thermal imagers (for example) to spy on
one's neighbors. Regardless of whether the public possesses thermal
imagers, we might say that it is not morally appropriate to covertly use
them on other people without consent.
There may be yet another way in which Kyllo can be used to create
an opportunity for official exploitation of CCTs, even before such
technology permeates the public. Kyllo's public use approach is
theoretically founded on the doctrine of "knowing exposure."'6 Going
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/179545.pdf.
196. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the
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back to the decision in Katz, the Court distinguished Mr. Katz's
conversation, which was meant to be and entitled to remain private, from
that behavior which may be knowingly exposed to and perceived by
others, which by contrast carries with it no privacy expectation.'97 Under
Kyllo's approach, the level of public availability of a technological device
is a guide to determining whether or not we have, routinely, knowingly
exposed our otherwise private affairs to observers who possess such a
device. This blind spot in the Kyllo opinion has implications for
technologies that we are routinely exposed to, even if the exposure is due
to official and institutional, rather than private and individual,
surveillance behavior.
For example, many municipalities have installed a vast array of
closed circuit video monitors to record activity taking place in public
places.' These monitors are operating around the clock, and are capable
of capturing higher resolution images over far greater distances than is
the human eye.' 9 When these monitors are used, intentionally or
inadvertently, to record human behavior, the Fourth Amendment would
be of no avail to a suspect seeking to challenge the admission of that
evidence." On a very simple level, activity that takes place in public is
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." (citations omitted)).
197. Id. at 352. The Court makes the distinction that Katz did not knowingly expose his
conversation to the public, but actually sought to exclude the "uninvited ear" when he entered the
public telephone booth. Id. The Court specifically stated that in regards to telephone booths: "One
who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcasted to the world."
Id.
198. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) surveyed law enforcement agencies
across the United States to ascertain current applications of CCTV/video cameras and assess its impact
in the field.

LAURA

J. NicHoLs,

CUrrING EDGE OF TECHNOLOGY: THE USE OF CCTVVIDEO CAMERAS IN

LAW ENFORCEMENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE EXECUTIVE BRIEF 3 (Mar. 2oo),

available at http:/lwww.theiacp.orglresearchlCuttingEdge/UseofCCTVExecBrief.pdf. Eighty percent
of agencies that responded to the IACP survey utilized CCTV, while half of the remaining 20%
anticipated using it in the future. id. at 4. Sixty-six percent of respondents have utilized CCTV for
more than five years. Id. at 5.The most frequent CCTV applications in law enforcement are in cars,
interrogation rooms, and government buildings; other uses include in high crime areas, courtrooms,
schools, parks, public housing, and at special events. Id. at 5.
199. For example, more than 150,ooo closed-circuit television cameras monitor public areas in
Britain, each equipped with a powerful zoom lens, which can read the wording on a cigarette packet at
one hundred yards and can track individuals wherever they go-even into buildings. David Banisar,
Big Brother Goes High Tech, COVERT ACTION Q., Spring 1996, at 6. Use of CCTV in the United States

is much more recent in comparison to other countries, such as the United Kingdom, which has
conducted most of the research regarding the effectiveness of CCTV applications. See MARTIN GILL &
ANGELA SPRIGGS, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND STATSTICS DIRECTORATE, RESEARCH

STUDY 292, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CCTV (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk
/rds/pdfso5/hors292.pdf; NICHOLS, supra note 198, at 5.
200. Of equally deep concern is the fact that, by definition, innocent or at least non-criminal
behavior captured by use of these cameras will provoke absolutely no response from the law as it
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not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection precisely because it has
been made public, and thus has been knowingly exposed. But this is not
factually true of activity that can only be observed because of the
technological sophistication of these high-resolution digital cameras; this
conduct does not truly take place in public, nor is it routinely observable
by members of the community. Instead, such conduct is constructively
public, and the logic of the construction flows from the ubiquity of the
cameras themselves. The basis of the legal fiction, that this manner of

observing otherwise private conduct is not a search, is that all members
of society are now well aware of the presence of these cameras, and are
or should be sufficiently conditioned to their presence that we are
presumed to have weighed that surveillance factor in our consideration

of how to behave in a monitored and recordable context."' The fiction
turns baseless when we realize that society is not, generally, aware of
either the ubiquity nor the powerful capacity of these surveillance
devices."'
In July 2001, the Tampa, Florida, Police Department began
monitoring Ybor City, a nightlife district, using advanced video

technology that contains a facial recognition system with the purpose of
identifying persons who are potentially wanted by police.

3

The facial

recognition system uses proprietary design technology to scan human
faces and identify matches with existing police records, and then
generates alerts to authorities based on the strength of the match.0 4 This
presently operates. My current focus on the Fourth Amendment is not meant to suggest that all that is
really at stake in these contexts is the rights of criminal actors to preserve illicit secrets, but rather
reflects the recognition that the Fourth Amendment is the primary vehicle for defining the law-abiding
public's right to be free from unwanted government intrusion. In such a regime, the vindication of the
constitutional rights of suspects protects the rights of the innocent because "[n]othing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter
of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.").
201. Similarly, courts have applied such an assumption of risk analysis upon joint occupants of a
residence thereby holding that when one occupant has voluntarily consented to a search it is valid
against the co-occupant, which then permits the government to use the evidence discovered in the
search against the co-occupant in a criminal trial. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)
(holding that shared tenancy is understood to include an "assumption of risk," on which police officers
are entitled to rely); see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (holding that by allowing his cousin
the use of a duffel bag, and by leaving the bag in his cousin's house, Frazier was held to have assumed
the risk that his cousin would allow someone else to look inside the bag).
202.

See, e.g.,

SURVEILLANCE

JERRY RATCLIFFE,

OF PUBLIC

PLACES

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE GUIDES SERIES

No. 4,

VIDEO

8-9 (Feb. 2oo6), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/

open.pdf?Item=i693.
203. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy,
and Human Emotions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2002, at 125.
204. See id. As the camera scans the crowd, the computer software searches the database to match
faces to wanted criminals. Id. Images that do not produce a match are discarded, while those that do
produce a match are reviewed by the system operator to "determine whether there was enough of a
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monitoring system is
is uniformly applied
without any prior
individuals that they

privately operated under contract with the city, and
to all people appearing in the targeted locations,
basis of suspicion.2" Disclaimer signs inform
are being monitored by "smart CCTV," but these

seem to provide little by way of actual notice.20 Similarly, the 2001 Super
Bowl was blanketed by digital surveillance cameras linked to the Facelt
facial recognition system in an effort to deter and detect public
lawlessness that had marred competitions in previous years."° Neither of
these uses, in particular, seem particularly objectionable on their face,
and it is precisely their palatability that will lead to their introduction
into a wider variety of contexts.
There is nothing inherently different about CCTs that would prevent
their similar usage. If we think forward to the day when CCTs are
capable of detecting legally relevant brain activity from a distance, one
can imagine the utility of installing a similar web of CCT receivers in
public spaces and randomly monitoring the thoughts of people who
happen to be milling about."' When the individual is located whose brain
scans are consistent with a present intention to rob the corner bank, for
example, authorities may be alerted prior to commission of the crime,
just as they are currently alerted to the presence of a wanted party by the
use of Facelt technology. If that cognitive evidence is then used as a basis

match to notify a uniformed officer to investigate and poissibly make an arrest." Id.
205. Id. The cameras do not initially seek out a specific individual; rather the system scans the
entire crowd, then attempts to match those images against the database, immediately discarding those
with no match. See id.
206. Id. ("Signs in the area warned passersby, 'Smart CCTV in use,' though most interviewed for a
news story on the system did not know what the message meant.").
207. Richard Lacayo, Terrorizing Ourselves, TIME, Sept. 24, 2001, at 92; Police System Analyzed
Every Face at Super Bowl, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A16; Louis Sahagun & Josh Meyer, Secret
Cameras Scanned Crowd at Super Bowl for Criminals; Surveillance: Faces Were Cross-Checked by New
Technology in Bid to Catch Terrorists, Other Suspects. Privacy Concerns Are Raised, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2001, at Ai; Peter Slevin, Police Video Cameras Taped FootballFans; Super Bowl Surveillance Stirs
Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,2001, at AI; The Digital Eye Is on You, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at Bio.
There were hundreds of stories written about surveillance at the Super Bowl from right before the
Super Bowl to eight or nine months later until the terrorist attacks of September i, 2001, after which
articles about surveillance during football's biggest game disappeared.
2o8. This is precisely what some advocates of Brain Fingerprinting or cognitive forensic
monitoring hope for. In fact, video cameras and other surveillance technology are viewed as creating a
potential counterbalance-a kind of virtual ombudsman for society at large. See Adam L. Penenberg,
The New Rules of Engagement: The Surveillance Society, WIRED, Dec. 2001, at 157, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.1 2/surveillance-pr.html.200I. For example, proponents of broad
electronic surveillance have cited the i991 beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles police officers,
which was caught on video, as an example of the benefits of such monitoring. See id. "Though the
subsequent trial ended in acquittal," advocates state that this "prove[s] the potency of videotapes as
evidence." Id. In fact, since the World Trade Center attacks of September Is, 2001, the usual
"fractious debate between privacy hawks and security hounds" has become muted insofar as the public
is willing to trade civil liberties in exchange for increased protection and surveillance capabilities. See
id. at 157.
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to intrude upon the freedom of the suspect, the Fourth Amendment
should come into play.
The problem is, under the circumstances described, the Fourth
Amendment inquiry will be short circuited by the fact of the CCTs'
widespread and notorious usage. Just as with closed circuit camera
monitoring, which may already be coupled with additional technology
like Facelt, CCTs could be used to create a pervasive web of
surveillance"' 9 which, when paired with tidy little disclaimer postings such
as those in Ybor City, effectively destroy our ability to expect not to have
our thoughts constantly monitored when appearing in public places. In
such a scenario, the theoretical underpinnings of Kyllo's technologycentered approach would allow a court to treat any subjectively private
thoughts occurring in a monitored public place as constructively
knowingly exposed for all to share.
B.

PLEASE, LET'S BE REASONABLE

Should either of the foregoing approaches prove inadequate, the
Fourth Amendment offers one final opportunity to vindicate the use of
CCTs. Instead of insisting on a strict complex of probable cause and
judicial approval, and instead of focusing on the prevalence of
technology in public usage or in public places, a court considering a
challenge to CCT evidence may simply ask whether it seems reasonable
to allow the government to collect evidence in such a fashion."' The logic
of this approach is that, because the Fourth Amendment only explicitly
requires that searches and seizures be reasonable, no particular litany of
conduct is per se necessary to insulate that conduct from constitutional
challenge, "' and no presumption of inadmissibility applies to warrantless
209. Complementary strands of that web are already being deployed, sometimes in what appear to
be the most benign ways. The current ubiquity of cell phones has, perhaps inadvertently, created a
massive-even global-human tracking system. Researchers at MIT are developing a project that
allows users to track "the flow of people around a city in real time." Go with the Flow: Data from
Mobile-Phone Networks Can Create Maps that Show How People Are Moving Around, ECONOMIST
TECH. Q., Mar. 1o, 2007, at 18. "The results take the form of luminous maps adorned with moving and
colour-coded arrows, dots and patches of light that indicate the speed and population density of
people in the city in question, with an accuracy down to a dozen or so metres." Id.
210.

The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of
information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the
essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. A brief stop of a suspicious
individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of facts known to the
officer at the time.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972) (citations omitted).
211. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("The fundamental command of the Fourth
Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although 'both the concept of probable
cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,... in certain limited
circumstances neither is required."' (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277
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intrusions.2 1 ' According to proponents of this reasonableness approach, a
court need only decide whether the government's interest in the
intrusion outweighs the individual's interest in being free therefrom." 3 In
essence, a court will weigh the official need for the search against the
extent of its invasiveness, where increasing need justifies more and more
personally invasive conduct." 4
This "reasonableness" alternative to the traditional approachessentially a balancing test-has its roots outside the criminal law,"1 5 and
this fact is the basis of its most significant drawback as a decision-making
model. First announced as a way to mitigate the harshness of the
Fourth Amendment in non-criminal contexts, the reasonableness
approach was used to permit government entry into private spaces based
on less than probable cause,217 but the context is instructive. The entry at
issue in the first reasonableness case was by municipal housing
inspectors -civil agents charged with the enforcement of non-criminal
housing code standards-and the question was whether these agents
needed to demonstrate full-blown, individualized suspicion as would be
required for a criminal investigation before they could inspect a subject
housing unit.,8 Recognizing that application of the traditional probable
cause standard would defeat the legitimate government purposes served
by the housing code inspection regime,1 9 the Camara Court sought to
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring))) (alteration in original).
212. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-

necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.").
213. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 ("On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order."); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 883 (975) (holding that the interference with individual liberty that results when an officer stops
an automobile based on reasonable suspicion and questions its occupants is modest when balanced
against the valid public interest of preventing illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border).
214. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 ("Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness
that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.").
215. The use of reasonableness as an explicit standard for resolving Fourth Amendment questions,
rather than as a way to identify the range of necessary exceptions to the probable cause-based warrant,
was developed as a standard for administrative, not criminal, search warrants. See Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
216. Academic critique of the Court's reasoning abounds. See, e.g., Robert Berkley Harper, Has
the Replacement of 'ProbableCause' with 'Reasonable Suspicion' Resulted in the Creationof the Best of
All PossibleWorlds?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 13, s6 (1988); Sundby, supra note 7, at 398 ("The Court's basic
inability to agree on when to use a reasonableness standard instead of traditional probable cause
evidences its failure in defining the relationship between the warrant and reasonableness clauses.").
217. Camara,387 U.S. at 534 (disagreeing with the appellant's contention that "code enforcement
inspection programs must be circumscribed by a warrant procedure, [and] ...that warrants should
issue only when the inspector possesses probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains
violations of the minimum standards prescribed by the code being enforced").
218. Id at538.
219. Id. at 535. ("The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional
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create a less rigorous alternative manner of mediating the relationship
between the individual and the government vis-A-vis private zones of
exclusion.22
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Camara held that, in certain
non-criminal settings where the need for the government's action was
greatly enhanced and the liberty violation of the intrusion was somewhat
reduced, a lower level of justification would be required before the
intrusion would be permitted.22 ' The Court reasoned that an
administrative warrant, issued pursuant to reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area search, would supplant
the probable cause standard where "the burden of obtaining a warrant is
likely to frustrate the government purpose behind the search .... .It was
also absolutely crucial to the Court's analysis that the inspectors sought
entry to enforce non-criminal housing code provisions. 23 Under these
circumstances, the individual presumably has less at stake because she is
not liable to arrest and prosecution (i.e. a loss of liberty), nor is she
subject to the level of stigma associated with criminality (i.e. a loss of
dignity), and thus has a reduced interest to be protected against
invasion.2 4
At its heart, Camarais about balancing-balancing the rights of the
individual against the communal interests protected by the state. The
reasonableness approach that was born of this decision by design
balances the interests of the individual in being let alone, or enforcing
her zone of exclusion, against the strength of the government's interest in
intruding upon her peace22' The decision recognizes that, by
consequence of life in a complex and heavily regulated society, there are
some community standards by which we must abide and which carry
associated inconveniences we must tolerate."'
Equally essential to Camara'sreasoning is the fact that it was a civil
case. 22 7' The public welfare purpose that characterized the government's
inspection program provided the inspectors with a "special need" to

development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety.").
220. Id. at 537 ("[B]ecause the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's
privacy.").
221. Id. at537.
222. Id. at 533.
223. Id. at 525-26. The inspection at issue was a routine annual inspection for possible violations of
the city's Housing Code. Id. at 526.
224. See id. at 537-38 (stating that "because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor
aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban
citizen's privacy").
225. Id. at 539.
226.
227.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 525-26.
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conduct generalized searches, a special need separate and apart from the
ordinary governmental interest in law enforcement."' The perceived
absence of such ordinary law enforcement interests in part justified the
lower level of Fourth Amendment protection provided by the Court."'
And yet it took only one year for a majority of Justices to seize on
the opportunity offered by Camara to author an assault on previously
well established Fourth Amendment principles. Almost as if the lines of
Camara had not been penned, Chief Justice Earl Warren imported
wholecloth Camara's reasonableness balancing approach into the
formerly-forbidden criminal context in Terry v. Ohio.3 ' Seeking to strike
a balance (ironically) between the need to regulate under the
Constitution unpredictable, street-level encounters between a largely
white police force and minority groups,23 ' and the need to empower
individual police officers to protect themselves from armed suspects,23 '
Chief Justice Warren turned to the balancing technique of the
reasonableness approach. 33 Now famously, the Terry Court declared it
reasonable for an officer to conduct a brief stop and limited frisk of a
suspect for weapons based on the officer's "articulable suspicion" of
criminality and dangerousness,234 a standard expressly less demanding
than probable cause. 35
Id. at 535-37.; see also Sundby, supra note 7.
Id. at 530 ("Since the inspector does not ask that the property owner open his doors to a
search for 'evidence of criminal action' which may be used to secure the owner's criminal conviction,
historic interests of 'self-protection' jointly protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are said
not to be involved, but only the less intense 'right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy."'
(quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,365 (959))).
230. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968).
231. Id. at 13-15 n.ii. Ironically, one element the Court did not factor into its analysis, was the
legitimate concerns about police prejudice toward blacks and other minorities. A 1966 study
reinforced the already known and observed bias against blacks by showing that, when "'[a]sked to
indicate in which locations they most expected to encounter antagonistic and hostile response to them,
policemen put the minority areas at the top of the list."' Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth
Amendment Legacy. Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271, 1311-12 (1998)
(quoting DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE: CONFRONTATION IN
AMERICA 91 (1969)); see also David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (994) (discussing how Terry transformed the law
and allowed for a criminal search and seizure without probable cause which resulted in increased stops
based simply on "location plus evasion").
232. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24. Furthermore, relying on statistics from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States-1966, the Court took notice of the
number of law enforcement officers who die in the line of duty and recognized that a substantial
portion of those deaths are caused by handguns. Id. at 24 n.2I. Because those weapons remain readily
available to potential criminals, these statistics were perceived to be "relevant to an assessment of the
[law enforcement] need for some form of self-protective search power." Id.
233. Id. at 20-21.
228.
229.

234. Id. at 27.

235. Id. ("Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to
conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for
the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
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The specific rule of the case is both well known and less important
for present purposes than its rearticulation of Camara'sbalancing logic
and its elevation of reasonableness as the method for regulating police
behavior. As did Justice White when considering the interest in housing
inspections, Justice Warren believed that an officer confronting a suspect
he reasonably believes is presently armed and dangerous faces a security
threat that raises considerations separate and apart from his obligations
as a law enforcement officer.236 This gives the officer an interest, in
addition to the standard penological interest in preventing crime, which
must be weighed against the individual's right to avoid such searches,237 at
least in the absence of probable cause.23 Diminishing that interest is the
nature of the search itself: it consists of a limited pat down of the exterior
clothing for the sole and exclusive purpose of identifying weapons that
could be used to harm the investigating officer on the present occasion. 39
Because this is not the sort of full-blown search that the Fourth
Amendment could permit, as it does in a search incident to arrest for
example, Chief Justice Warren saw the scales tipping in favor of the
government just as they had in Camara,and for the same reasons. 4
Since the decision in Terry the Court has moved with near-perfect
consistency to use the reasonableness approach in an ever wider range of
circumstances. 4 ' The question of whether it is reasonable to allow official
application of CCTs is therefore likely to be considered if not actually
answered under the rubric of reasonableness. Although it is not clear
when such simple interest balancing is the proper approach,242 it is at least
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime.").
236. Id. at 26.
237. Id. at 26-27.
238. Indeed, the Terry doctrine is specifically designed for, and reflects the particular pressures
upon, officers who have suspicion regarding criminal activity that falls short of probable cause and
who nonetheless must be free to engage in on-the-spot inquiries to dispel that suspicion in order to
protect themselves. The Court has elsewhere said that Terry-style balancing is inappropriate in
traditional search and seizure situations where probable cause, not articulable suspicion, is the
applicable standard. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) ("The narrow intrusions
involved in [Camara, Terry, and their progeny] were judged by a balancing test rather than by the
general principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported by the 'long-prevailing
standards' of probable cause only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion
associated with an arrest." (citation omitted)).
239. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30.
240. See id. at 27. The additional extensions of Terry, both doing away with the express and
structurally-required case-by-case nature of the rule and its further incursion into "ordinary" criminal
cases, bear noting but are not analytically germane to the remainder of this discussion.
241. That is to say that, since the decision in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), the Court has
not found a reasonableness case it didn't like. Every opinion to reach the Court has ultimately granted
the government's request to proceed under a reasonableness approach rather than being held to the
traditional warrant preference standard.
242. Compare Kenneth C. Halcom, Illegal Predicate Searches and the Good Faith Exception, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 467 (discussing situations in which the balancing approach could or should be used),
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arguably more commonly invoked in situations when the government is
serving some interest other than its routine executive law enforcement
obligation. 43 If there is arguably another legitimate purpose at stake in
the use of CCTs, and if the conventional approach to Fourth
Amendment interpretation in fact threatens to thwart that legitimate
purpose, then balancing may appear to become necessary. This is how
CCTs will truly make their way into our lives, because once they carry
the stamp of reasonableness, they will become a part of the social and
jurisprudential landscape.
The argument on this admissibility question would be fascinating.
Lawyers for the government will trot out a series of unquestionable but
unprovable claims about how the information they seek to extract (or
already extracted) from suspect X, using CCTs, was a part of an ongoing
terrorism investigation. The executive contends that terrorism is a special
case, separate and perhaps more compelling than "ordinary" criminality
and presents the necessary "special need," and none can (or dare)
question the government's interest in its prevention. The lawyer would
then describe for the court that the suspect simply had to wear a light
crown of electrodes for a few minutes and look at a few pictures while
test administrators collected data. The lawyer would describe how the
suspect felt nothing, much less pain, and didn't even have to speak for
the investigator to get what she wanted. Weigh this interest against the
nature of the intrusion. Reasonable?
The suspect, on the other hand, cannot describe the nature of the
intrusion. He denies the allegations or any involvement in terrorism, but
he cannot know what the operators of the CCT saw in his head. No one
could know what their brain is doing, what areas are firing or how fast, as
they are asked a question. However, the CCT device knows, and it gives
the operator informational power over the suspect. The experience gives
little physical sensation, and the feeling of being robbed of your thoughts
is difficult to convey. Weigh this intrusion against the government's
interest. Still reasonable?
The key is that it is debatable. The answer to this debate will change
with political influence and the nature of the public's most recent fear or
obsession, but this is unacceptable. It is here where the law must be

and Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance:Accurately Setting the Scales Through the
Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988) (criticizing the use of this balancing
test in principle due to its inherent subjectivity, its tendency to deprive constitutional rights of the
special protection they deserve, and the likelihood that the test will produce inconsistent results), with
Amitai Etzioni, You'll Love Those National ID Cards, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2002, at I I
(applying a balancing approach and concluding that the USA PATRIOT Act is a reasonable
protection of security and contending that these measures will promote public safety and reduce the
risk of future terrorist acts).
243. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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absolute, must be resolute, and must not offer up for debate the
alienability of our inalienable rights. The reasonableness approach is
jurisprudentially challenging because, as intuitive as balancing seems, it
offers an addictive way to avoid answering the difficult questions about
the Fourth Amendment. It is, for these reasons, a very poor vehicle for
limiting the spread and abuse of CCTs.
IV.

SALVATION THROUGH INTERPRETATION

If the problem sketched above is that the Fourth Amendment as we
know it has spawned doctrines that are incapable of protecting us from
being undone by CCTs, then there seem to be only two choices. One is to
learn to live with CCTs. We could eventually convince ourselves that
CCTs are for the greater good. We could be like Winston Smith in 19842"
and find a glint of love and happiness amidst Big Brother's web of
omnipotent surveillance. 4 But after all, given what losing the sanctity of
our mind and our right to be alone with our thoughts will cost, I suspect
we will also end up just as Orwell's tragic hero ultimately did: pummeled
and tortured and alone, cut off from what we knew and what we once
loved.24 6

A rosier option is simply to reinterpret the Fourth Amendment, and
to reinvigorate it with a newly understood complement of fundamental
principles. Great minds have complained that the Fourth Amendment is
unprincipled 47 and unbalanced,24" but that is because the courts have
244. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (New Am. Library i96i) (1949).
245. Id. at 137. In contemplating their inevitable discovery, capture, and reprogramming by Big

Brother for their love affair, Winston responds to Julie's capitulation to confession under torture: "I
don't mean confessing. Confession is not betrayal. What you say or do doesn't matter; only feelings
matter. If they could make me stop loving you-that would be the real betrayal."
246. id. at 240. After his relentless torture and mental reprogramming to compel him to follow the
ways of Big Brother, Winston Smith, meets again his former lover, Julia:
"I betrayed you," she said baldly.
"I betrayed you," he said.
"Sometimes," she said, "they threaten you with something-something you can't stand up to,
can't even think about. And then you say, 'Don't do it to me, do it to somebody else, do it
to so-and-so.' And perhaps you might pretend, afterwards, that it was only a trick and that
you just said it to make them stop and didn't really mean it. But that isn't true. At the time
when it happens you do mean it. You think there's no other way of saving yourself and
you're quite ready to save yourself that way. You want it to happen to the other person.
You don't give a damn what they suffer. All you care about is yourself."
"All you care about is yourself," he echoed....
"And after that, you don't feel the same toward the other person any longer."
Id.
247. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, IO7 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1996); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985); Brian
J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 583 (j989); "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the
Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997); David E. Steinberg, Restoring the
Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding Revisted, 33 HASTINGS CONsr. L. Q. 47 (2o05);
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been struggling to come to terms with a privacy norm they ultimately
cannot believe in. 249 I suggest that there are two complementary
methods"' for interpreting the Constitution, and thus the Fourth
Amendment, that could offer broad resolution of this interpretive
dilemma and which I use to support the nomination of a new Fourth
Amendment norm that I have dubbed "informational property. '
A. INTRATEXTUALISM
Prior to seeking meaning in the text and context of the Fourth
Amendment, or any other constitutional provision, it is necessary to
select a method for conducting the search.252 The selection of one or
more complementary methods provides a starting point in the
interpretive process, and allows one to proceed from the initial
constitutional premise to a concrete operational legal principle. 3 Of
course, the selection of method will also have consequences for the
product of the analysis, and therefore deserves separate scrutiny. 54
Intratextualism is a mode of constitutional interpretation that
derives meaning from the text by reading "a word or phrase in a given
clause by self-consciously comparing and contrasting it to identical or

Sundby, supra note 7.
248. See generally Kendra H. Chilcoat, The Automobile Exception Swallows the Rule: Florida v.
White, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 917, 947 (2000); Frank R. Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth
Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851
(2002).

249. See generally Melissa Arbus, A Legal U-Turn: The Rehnquist Court Changes Direction and
Steers Back to the Privacy Norms of the Warren Era, 89 VA. L. REV. 1729 (2003); Marc J. Blitz, Video
Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That
Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1349 (2004); Lawrence Friedman, Establishing Information
Privacy Violations: The New York Experience, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 651 (2003); Alan K. Ku, Talk Is
Cheap, but a Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words: Privacy Rights in the Era of Camera Phone

Technology, 45

SANTA CLARA

L. REV. 679 (2005).

250. Those being intratextualism and organism-perpetuating constitutional consistency.
251. This theory of the Fourth Amendment will be developed in a forthcoming article, but the
basic contours necessary for present purposes involve a recognition of the primacy of information in
gauging the individual interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, and a grounding of that
perceived interest in notions of property entitlement.
252. Richard H. Fallon Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, lOO
HARV. L. REV. I189, 1232 (1987) [hereinafter, Fallon, ConstitutionalInterpretation];Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 538-39 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutions as "Living Trees"? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors, 75
FORDHAM

L.

REV. 921, 925-26 (2006).

253. David Chang, Selling the Market-Driven Message: Commercial Television, Consumer
Sovereignty, and the FirstAmendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 451, 493-94 (2000); Frederick Schauer, The
Occasionsof ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 B.U. L. REV. 729, 730 (1992).
254. See Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 594
(1999); Fallon, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 252, at 562; William C. Porth & Robert P.
George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause, 9 0 W. VA. L.
REV. 109, 120

(1987).

HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 357 2007-2008

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vo1. 59:309

similar words or phrases elsewhere in the Constitution., 5 As Professor
Akhil Amar describes in his article Intratextualism, the intratextualist
"interpreter tries to read a contested word or phrase that appears in the
Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the
same (or a very similar) word or phrase. '56 The basic premise on which
intratextualism proceeds is that similarity in the founders' word choice
reflects similarity in the intended meaning of linguistically comparable
provisions. 57
Professor Amar identifies three different species of intratextualist
models,"" and describes them as working on increasing levels of
abstraction. The most straightforward type of intratextualism treats the
Constitution as a whole as a multivolume dictionary. 59 What Amar calls
Intratextualism as Philology simply allows interpreters to look to the
meaning given to the ambiguous language when used in other sections of
the Constitution, and prefers the contextualized meaning of
constitutional phrases over the discrete ordinary meaning of individual
words 6° A slightly more nuanced form of intratextualism,
Intratextualism as Pattern Recognition, 6, uses the recurrence of identical
or similar language as indicative of "a much deeper thematic connection,
a sympathetic vibration evidencing a rich harmony at work. '' , 6' By
"encouraging us to place nonadjoining clauses alongside each other for
analysis because they use the same (or very similar) words and
phrases.., we may see important patterns" revealed in the constitutional
structure which will ultimately illuminate ambiguous language. 63 Amar's
third intratextual model looks not just at specific words but at recurrent
phrasing and assumes that the recurrence of the phrases signals the
coextensiveness of the commands.264 When two similarly-phrased
constitutional provisions are involved, they are to be read "in pari
materia.' 6 "The key to this brand of intratextualism is interpolation: we
read the [comparable] commands as if a metacommand clause existed
telling us to construe parallel commands in parallel fashion." 66
It is also important to understand what intratextualism is not. Amar
is explicitly seeking to complement the existing panoply of interpretative

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Ahkil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).

Id.
See id.
Id. at 791.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 792.

262. Id. at 793.
263. Id.

264 . Id. at 794-95.
265. Id. at 794.
266. Id. at 795.
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techniques with intratextualism as a way to honor the text as a holistic
endeavor 67 Intratextualism is to be used alongside familiar "clausebound," historical, structural, pragmatic, process-based, and ideological
methods. 8 In particular, Amar sees important similarities and
differences between his intratextualist theory and Professor Charles
Black's structuralist method of constitutional interpretation .269 While
both recognize the importance of the "larger constitutional patterns at
7
work" in the Constitution as guides to determining its meaning,
structuralism interprets language through the lens of the interrelated

formal government structures created by the text, while intratextualism
focuses on the interrelationships within the text itself.7 '
Less explicitly but certainly by virtue of his theoretical reach, Amar
is contending against several modes of constitutional interpretation other
than those he lists. He is not arguing in favor of basic interpretive
holism ,2 which simply suggests that we read the document as a whole
and seek to discover how the various provisions fit together. 7 3 Amar is a
holist, but more of a textual holist, seeking to find the "fit" through
language specifically. Amar is also not advocating what Professor Vicki
Jackson is calling Holistic Interpretation " 4 (although he would not likely
disagree fundamentally with the derivation of her model). Jackson's
version of holistic interpretation seeks to preserve the link between old

provisions of the text and more recent interpretations

of and

amendments to its meaning. 7 1 In particular, Jackson adds to Amar's
intratextualist approach by allowing temporally disjointed provisions to

267. Id. at 790.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270.

Id.

Id. at 790-91.
See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Figuring the Law: Holism and Tropological Inference in Legal
Interpretation,97 YALE L.J. 823, 836 (1988); Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural
Method, or How Charles Black Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and
Congressional Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833, 835 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, I1 MICH. L. REV. 885, 885 (2003); Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A.
Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with lntratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 730
271.

272.

(2000).

273. Holism is "an approach that seeks to take into account the basic structure and values of the

Constitution in the interpretation of all of its provisions.., and it reflects in its understanding of
'basic' values those values that are implicit in later enacted amendments and, where they are in conflict
with earlier values, to give weight to the later-enacted amendments within the traditions of the
interpretive discourse." Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our
Bifurcated Constitution,53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1281 (2OO). Another author describes "holism [als the
belief that reality should [be] seen in terms of interacting and interdependent 'wholes'-a living
organism... -rather than isolated and independent parts." Erika Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism,
and the ProceduralConception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 273.
274. See Jackson, supra note 273, at 1281.
275. Id. See also Jackson, supra note 154, at 270.
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inform one another,276 and by placing priority on the more recent
understandings. 77 Jackson's holistic interpretation is designed to be more
responsive to social change and more progressive in honoring advancing
notions of equality and justice than the more "traditional" or
"conventional" models.78 Finally, Amar is definitely not advancing the
sort of "free-form" method of interpretation defended by Professors
Ackerman and Golove and criticized by Professor Tribe in his article
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation.79 There is no room in the intratextualist
framework for interpreting constitutional sections solely by reference to
the content of congressional-executive agreement.
In fact, Amar's intratextualism may be seen to fall somewhere along
a spectrum of interpretive theories that range from narrow and
restrictive to broad, open-ended and even unconstrained. The spectrum
may begin at one pole with clause-bound, purely textualist approaches
(and a few variations on textualism such as originalism and original
meaning). This blends into the "customary" approaches that alternately
emphasize either historical or contemporary practices and standards as
illustrative of constitutional meaning. From there, the spectrum leads to
the myriad holistic approaches, from interpretive holism in general and
Professor Black's more specific structuralism, to Amar's intratextualism
triptych, through Jackson's holistic interpretation and, eventually on to
the free-form model decried by Tribe.
From this menu of varying interpretive fare, intratextualism (and, by
extension, holistic constitutional interpretation) provides a very useful
model with which to begin shaping a new Fourth Amendment order. It
has many of the "conservatizing". benefits of a textualist approach, by
beginning with the constitutional language, yet improves on that
conventional method by leaving the language in (rather than divorcing it
from) its scriptural context. An intratextualist approach may also be
easily reconciled with an originalist approach, to the extent that the
276. See Jackson, supra note 273, at 1284-85.
277. Id. at 1289-90.
278. Jackson, supra note 154, at 278.
279. io8 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1279-80 (1995) ("Professor Ackerman's general theory is that even
constitutional amendment is possible through informal means of higher lawmaking by what he would
describe as 'the People.' Under such a theory, the constraining power of text and structure is eroded
almost to the vanishing point.").
280. See id. at 1278-79.
281. Textualism "focuses ...on the words Congress has enacted, relying on ordinary usage,
dictionary definitions, canons of construction, and harmonization with similar language in other laws
or in other provisions of the same statute." James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judical
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 175 (2003). "[Ilnterpretation should focus 'upon what the text
would reasonably be understood to mean, rather than upon what it was intended to mean."' Caleb
Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 352 (20o5) (quoting Antonin Scalia, Response, in A
MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129, I44 (Amy Gutman ed. I997)).
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various provisions that must be used to inform each other in an
intratextualist model can be individually subjected to an analysis that
begins with original meaning of language.
This should not be read to suggest that intratextualism can be
classified together with these inherently retrospective interpretive
techniques. Because the very essence of intratextualism is a commitment
to construing a given constitutional provision in harmony with other
provisions that may be germane to the same matter,22 it leads to a more
expansive range of potential answers to the analytical question than
would either textualism or originalism.3 Whether history and traditional
practices, or rather contemporary social customs and evolving social
mores are to guide our thinking on constitutional questions is not a
matter answered by intratextualism.24 Instead, as is arguably proper, a
legal consideration of the interpretive question may make use of what
data seems most relevant and instructive given the specifics of the matter
without complicating the holistic interpretive mode. Holistic
constitutional interpretation forces those who would articulate a meaning
for an ambiguous provision to contend with the legal and social
developmental forces that have shaped the meaning given to other
relevant portions of the Constitution. Meaning derived by an expanded
intratextualist approach is therefore not rooted in the past, but rather
leaves room for change and revision with the passage of time because of
the perceived interdependent nature of the various constitutional
provisions.
A holistic intratextual interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, in
the face of the question presented by the use of CCTs, would offer
several important clues to solution. In the first instance, we would have
to read the specific guarantees of the Amendment in light of the
overarching liberty-preserving intentions of the Bill of Rights. Given the
political pressures to which the Bill of Rights was a response,
intratextualist analysis suggests that the particular restrictions of the
Fourth Amendment were but specific ways to preserve fundamental
rights from infringement by official forces. 5 This provides a lens through
which to view the Fourth Amendment that requires liberal construction
of the freedoms preserved therein, and suggests that we must find Fourth
282. See Amar, supra note 255, at 792-93.

283. See id. at 788-91. Here Amar states that his theory has characteristics of other preeminent
theories but it combines many different aspects of those theories to create a more robust interpretive
tool. Id.
284. See id. at 789 (stating that "intratextualism also seems distinct from standard forms of
argument based on history and original intent").
285. While the Bill of Rights, as passed in 1791, only applied to the federal government by its
terms, the Supreme Court's "incorporation" of (most of) the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause makes it unnecessary to distinguish-in a statement like thisfederal from state actors.
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Amendment meaning that best effectuates, rather than compromises,
that robust sense of security sought by the founders. This also gives such
a constructive modeling of the Amendment a firm basis in the
constitutional text itself.
By virtue of the nature of the threat posed by CCTs, an
intratextualist would also turn to the First Amendment for inspiration in
coming to grips with Fourth Amendment meaning. To read the First and
Fourth Amendments together is to integrate these two pivotal
components of the larger body of reserved rights into a more informed
whole. The First Amendment describes spheres of intimate cognitive and
expressive activity into which the government may not intrude. Again,
these are the zones of exclusion which the Constitution as a whole was
designed to create, zones where the exclusion of other authority is meant
to vest the occupant of the zone with discretion undiminished unless
expressly done by operation of the document itself.
I would then argue that the freedom of conscience, or of
consciousness, enshrined in the various clauses of the First Amendment,
demands the respect and service of the Fourth Amendment. Behaviors
or techniques that intrude upon our freedom of thought and freedom of
belief, and upon the right to keep those thoughts and beliefs to ourselves,
must be discouraged and prevented by the Fourth Amendment in order
to promote First Amendment values. This is true even if the particular
behavior being evaluated would not violate the applicable First
Amendment test. The presence of a larger, well understood First
Amendment norm toward protecting cognitive autonomy should inform
the interpretive process over rote mechanical applications of specific
doctrinal tests. In such an arrangement, where separate constitutional
provisions are read in harmony rather than tension with one another, the
interpretive process fosters a mutually reinforcing relationship between
the provisions wherein neither Amendment is required to satisfy the
whole of its liberty-preserving obligation single-handedly.
Finally, it would be improper to discuss a liberty-preserving effect of
the Bill of Rights in its entirety, as an indicator of how we should
interpret a component of the Bill, without thinking about how the Due
Process Clause's specific guarantees might be instructive. For better or
worse, the Court has engaged in a "gradual process of inclusion and
exclusion" to determine which fundamental rights belong in the Due
Process Clause envelope, 86 handpicking over time which of the Bill of
286. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). In Duncan, the Court
held that due process requires the states to provide jury trial in serious criminal cases because "trial by
jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice." Id. at 148-49 (majority
opinion); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (196 6 ) (establishing bright-line rules to
guard against coerced confessions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (I96I) (holding that fruits of
unreasonable searches or seizures must be excluded at state trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
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Rights will be included within the working definition of liberty."7 Given
the foregoing discussion, it is only necessary to state that, whatever this
working definition of liberty might entail, the Fourth Amendment should
be read in such a way as to preserve civil liberty from unjustified
infringement.
Yet I have come to find it more useful to think about the place that
property has in our constitutional order. On equal footing with liberty,
both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments protect property against
due process violations, and do so in a way that is syntactically identical to
liberty.98 Thus, materialist critiques aside, we can fairly say that the
protection of property is as important to American constitutional values
as is the preservation of liberty. The intratextualist consequence of this
hypothesis is that the Fourth Amendment'89 cannot be read in a libertysaturated vacuum, but must also embrace originalist and contemporary
understandings of the fundamental individual rights that vest on account
of and through proprietary interests.
Perhaps we have been even too enamored of generalized liberty
concepts when thinking about the Bill of Rights and Due Process.
Perhaps the failings of the Fourth Amendment identified in this Article
and by those on whose work I rely is a consequence of thinking about it
only in terms of liberty-and derivative notions of penumbral
privacy°-and not in the straightforward terms of property rights and

interests. I contend, although I leave for another day to prove, that
thinking about the Fourth Amendment in terms of property better solves
the doctrinal tensions complicating the Amendment, and better solves
the problem of balancing the rights of individuals against the power of
government than does thinking about liberty alone. The crux of the
thesis is that property rights reflect positive legal entitlements that
provide an objective basis for constitutionalizing the outer boundaries of
the zones of exclusion which our proprietary interests create. The basic
norms of property law which would be necessary to import are I) the
right to exercise dominion and control over the property; 2) the right to
335, 344-45 (1963) (announcing per se right to appointed counsel).
287. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at i68.
288. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
289. The Fourth Amendment and its privacy norm have long been associated primarily with
liberty interests, both generally and in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
290. See Donald L. Doernberg, "Can You Hear Me Now?": Expectations of Privacy, False Friends,
and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L.
REV. 253, 275 (2006) (suggesting that, even before Katz, "the Court used something like an
expectation-of-privacy approach to allow the introduction of evidence that one might have thought to
be constitutionally protected. Since Katz, the Court has often used the approach to declare the
absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy in circumstances in which a majority of people
probably believe that the Fourth Amendment does and should protect them from government
prying").
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exclude non-permissive occupants or uses of the property; and 3) the
right to elective alienation or disposition of the property.
Application of this thesis to CCTs proceeds in an equally concise
fashion. We would begin with the unremarkable proposition that we
have dominion and control over our bodies,2 9' and with the short
extrapolation that we also own the products of or emanations from our
bodies not voluntarily abandoned.292 This means that, not only from a
normative standpoint but from a positive legal position, we own our
thoughts and the underlying cognitive processing structure that produces
them. This is property over which the individual must exercise complete
dominion and control. The locus of production of this capital is a zone of
exclusion with boundaries which must be constitutionally policed in part
because of the place property interests occupy in the constitutional
order.293 And the collection of our cognitive capital must be done in a
fashion that respects the individual's sole and exclusive right to direct the
alienation of their cognitive possessions.294 It is because the Fourth
Amendment, as currently understood, would not likely achieve these
particular results in the face of widespread use of CCTs that an
intratextualist approach, incorporating property interests, offers a
superior model of the Amendment than does a more restrictive
interpretivist focus on privacy.
B.

ORGANISM-PERPETUATING CONSTITUTIONAL CONSISTENCY

The previous section is meant to suggest that there is great utility in
reading organizationally separate constitutional provisions in a reflexive
fashion, so as to inform the interpretive analysis with the larger spirit
imbuing the document. This is an advantage over any of the de291. See, e..g., Michelle B. Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in Human
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 241 (i990); Roger F. Friedman, It's My Body and I'll Die fl Want To: A
Property-Based Argument in Support of Assisted Suicide, 12 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 183, 20005 (995); Radhika Rao, Property,Privacy, and the Human Body, 8o B.U. L. REV. 359, 367-71 (2ooo);

Anne Reichman Schiff, Arisingfrom the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation,75 N.C. L. REV.
901, 914-15 n.64 (1997) ("'If... one owns one's body, then, on the embodiment theory of personhood,
the body is quintessentially personal property because it is literally constitutive of one's personhood."'
(quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Propertyand Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957,966 (1982))).
292. It may be helpful to think of an agricultural analogy for this proposition. Just as a farmer,
possessing title to his land, need not possess separate title to the apple tree that grows on his land, nor
need she have explicit title to the fruits that the apple trees will seasonally produce, likewise, if we may
be presumed to hold some sort of natural title to our bodies, then we must have title to the processesbiological, neurological, and cognitive-that take place within us and to the products of those
processes. Again, as with any type of property that can be alienated, voluntary surrender of this
property is an available choice for the individual possessing the proprietary interest.
293. One need look no further than the Constitution's venerable Due Process Clauses, contained
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, for a reflection of the central and fundamental importance
of property rights in our national system of government.
294. These are rights that pertain to property in general, and no less so when the property at issue
happens to be information generated by or regarding an individual's cognitive functions.
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contextualized methods of deriving constitutional meaning, but it still has
a limitation which I would like to transcend. If employed strictly
according to its logic, intratextualist understandings of the Fourth
Amendment would be circumscribed by doctrinal developments in the
area of intratextualist comparison. To continue the example used above,
the universe of First Amendment rights that should be read to motivate
the regulation of law enforcement actors under the Fourth Amendment
would be limited to those techniques which, if employed against an
individual, would also violate the First Amendment.295
This is an artificial limitation which creates constitutional
redundancy in what is otherwise a rather progressive interpretive model.
While it might produce somewhat expansive results when the form of the
government behavior would implicate one area of constitutional
regulation but not another, and where the consequences of the
government behavior would implicate both, intratextualist responses to
constitutional interpretive moments force two or more related provisions
to overlap perfectly and thus deny the necessity and utility of having
both. This is the sort of hybridizing of rights which has been suggested on
occasion but never validated as a legitimate approach to interpreting
constitutional rights. 6
295. Although it may sound unlikely, such a situation is not hard to imagine. In fact, there have
been several cases that raise just such a tandem First-and-Fourth Amendment challenge. In Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), the newspaper that was the subject of the challenged search
argued that the officers' activity was invalid under the Fourth Amendment because it intruded on the
freedom of the press guaranteed in the First. Id. at 552. In some ways, this was an intratextualist
argument in that it relied on First Amendment principles of prior restraint to justify regulation of
search and seizure activity. The newspaper argued that, because of the First Amendment connection,
the searching officers should have been held to a standard more stringent than probable cause before
being granted judicial authorization in the form of a search warrant. Id. at 563-64. In what might be
described as an intratextualist response, the Court denied relief, but not because it found the First
Amendment interests at stake irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment question presented, but because it
found that a judicial determination of probable cause properly balances those First Amendment
interests with the competing executive interest in law enforcement effectiveness. Id. at 567. In essence,
the Court was comfortable concluding that the newspaper's freedom to publish was not infringed by
officers searching the news office based on a valid warrant. This is the natural but problematic
conclusion we should expect from a narrow intratextualist approach.
296. See Justice Scalia's effort to explain the outcome in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (99o). There, the Justice suggested:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a
neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press or the right of parents
to direct the education of their children. Some of our cases prohibiting compelled
expression, decided exclusively upon free speech grounds, have also involved freedom of
religion. And it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association
grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns. The present case
[Smith] does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with
any communicative activity or parental right.
Id. at 881-82 (citations and footnote omitted). Subsequent critiques of this hybridized First
Amendment theory have identified numerous analytical and interpretive problems posed by Scalia's
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I seek to promulgate a new version of holistic constitutional
interpretation that avoids the limiting effects of strict intratextualism.
Organism-perpetuating constitutional consistency is a proposal to reconceive of the constitution not as a written instrument but as a living
being." Of course, this is a figurative rather than literal approach, but it
allows us to employ intuitive and developing biological understandings of
living systems and a model of constitutional health that simplifies
constitutional quandaries, and which avoids the internal limitations of
intratextualism. Under an organism-perpetuating model, Fourth
Amendment standards can be informed by First Amendment values, but
will not be limited to application in instances where the First
Amendment would do the job.
To build on the biological analogy, organism-perpetuating
constitutional interpretation takes organic health and the universality of
the survival instinct as its starting points. In simplest terms, organic
health is a state of vitality and robustness, free of disease or defect in the
physical body.298 Organism-perpetuating constitutional models would
therefore seek to preserve and promote that vitality, and eschew the
introduction of any disease or defect that is destructive to the body.
Biological health tends to maximize survival, and survival is the strongest
genetic incentive, so we should likewise understand the Constitution to
promote action in accordance with its best health prospects and to ensure
approach. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (I993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("And the distinction Smith draws
strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right
is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and,
indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and
associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a
litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under
another constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith
calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all."); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of
Ohio State University, 5 F.3d 177, 18o (6th Cir. 1993) (describing the hybrid rights distinction as
"completely illogical"). See also William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111, 1120-22 (s99o) (describing Smith as "contrary to the deep
logic of the First Amendment" and identifying serious flaws in the Court's treatment of precedent).
Intratextualism, despite its promise, suffers from the same infirmity in that it limits the coordinated
effect of collaboratively-construed constitutional provisions to circumstances where one provision
would suffice to do the job. This manner of constitutional interpretation is generally to be avoided.
297. This is somewhat different than the assertion that the Constitution should be understood as a
"living document," which implies that its meaning can and should change over time, just as living
beings do throughout their life cycle. In keeping with the "living document" argument, organismperpetuating constitutional consistency recognizes that change is an unavoidable consequence of the
passage of time. However, in contrast to "a living document" rubric, organism-perpetuating
constitutional consistency seeks to describe that gradual change as a function of the need to regulate
and coordinate internal processes that characterize living beings.
298. Health is defined as "the condition of being sound in body, mind, or spirit; especially: freedom
from physical disease or pain." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th
ed. 2000).
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its own survival.
Organism-perpetuating models thus reject the utility if not the very
validity of construing constitutional provisions as operating in tension
with one another. Just as biological health is impaired when collaborative
systems become antagonistic to each other,2" so too is the health of the
Constitution impaired when coexisting coordinate legal provisions are
applied in an antagonistic fashion. In concrete terms, organismperpetuating models prevent an interpretation of the Constitution that
causes one process (i.e. provision) of the organism (i.e. the Constitution)
to impair the full and optimal functioning of another.
An interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that permits the
government to employ CCTs is the flesh-eating virus of the Constitution
because it leads to the necrosis of First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment values. The conflicts between the use of CCTs and these
legal interests already having been sketched, the point now is to
appreciate how such an interpretation derogates from the overall health
of the Constitution by impairing the functioning of other aspects of the
constitutional body. Organism-perpetuating models, recognizing as
constitutionally significant the drive to survive and to promote well
coordinated, orderly internal regulation of processes, demand and
produce a more healthful result.
Organism-perpetuating consistency is an interpretive model capable
of parallel application to larger organic aggregations than the
Constitution. While thinking about the founding charter as a living being,
where orderly reconciliation of internal processes is necessary, we may
simultaneously conceive of American society as a highly diversified
organic being that demands harmony among its governing processes.
One of those governing processes is obviously the law; it is an
institutional model for regulating interpersonal and intercommunity
relationships. Another of those governing processes is our socialization
or acculturation to shared social norms; as described in Part II, one of
those shared social norms is belief in the existence of a zone of cognitive
exclusion to which everyone is entitled. With these two social organizing
concepts, organism-perpetuating constitutional consistency would seek
to harmonize and avoid any interpretive outcomes that create hostility
between the two legitimate forces. The point is that the law should not be
assumed to operate in a contentious fashion in relation to that which our
299. A very simplistic, non-medically savvy example is diabetes. For purposes of the analogy, the
disease can be described as a non-cooperative relationship between the endocrine system's production
of insulin and the metabolic dependency on glucose as an energy source. Failure of the endocrine
system to produce optimal levels of blood glucose are incompatible with the body's effort to regulate
energy production and is, as is well documented, destructive to the overall health of the organism. So
too may one constitutional provision be interpreted in a manner that interferes with the optimal
functioning of another and with the optimal functioning of society.
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social intuitive judgment knows to be true.
Either application of the organic model, at the constitutional level or
social organizational level, suggests that a principle other than privacy
should be woven into Fourth Amendment analysis. For precisely the
same reasons as explored using an intratextualist approach, the propertybased notion of Fourth Amendment freedom strikes a better balance
with the remainder of the organic constitution. Thinking about the
Fourth Amendment in terms of property makes more, rather than less,
robust the values and interests we have come to associate with the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments because such an approach
makes it easier to preserve the various zones (or single multi-faceted
zone) of exclusion they each help to create.
CONCLUSION

The preceding arguments are offered to suggest three things. First, a
time is coming when the internal environment of the mind will no longer
be logistically capable of absolute protection from unwanted invasion.
Instead, on the horizon is the development of additional and enhanced
CCTs that promise to intrude upon our zone of cognitive autonomy and
prevent exercise of our right to exclude others from our thoughts and
thought processes. Second, I mean to suggest that the arrival of such
technologies may signal nothing less than a shift in our very nature, both
in our individual subjective identities and in our political existence as
members of a self-proclaimed liberal democracy. Because CCTs have the
capacity to intrude upon and then interfere with the natural operation of
our cognitive explorations and the internal monologue that gives us a
voice for the "I" who thinks and therefore is, the development of CCTs
are exerting dangerous evolutionary pressure on preexisting legal and
social norms. Indeed, the scope of Fourth Amendment protections
provided for in cases like Katz, Camara (and Terry), Riley, and Kyllo is
dangerously ill-adapted to respond to the harms threatened by CCT
development. Finally, I mean to suggest that a robust and sustainable
understanding of the Constitution, and of constitutional freedoms,
requires that the law resist that evolutionary pressure and that it strive to
preserve as unfettered those idiosyncratic cognitive processes that define
our character and give us a sense of self that is distinct and discreet from
the larger community. Employing a model of the Fourth Amendment
that serves these aims not only makes for a more realized individual, and
a freer society, but it also promotes the health, vitality, and longevity of
our constitutional system by reconciling all internal forces with one
another and fostering a harmonized whole.
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